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for misconduct or incapability. The article addresses the question of
when the dismissal of an employee for misconduct or incapability is

appropriate. The discussion focuses upon three major concerns in
the law on unfair dismissal: (1) a comparison of the British require-

ment of "reasonableness" in dismissal cases with the American arbitration requirement that there be a "just cause" for dismissal; (2) a
comparison of the procedures followed and factors used to evaluate
the appropriateness of an employer's decision to discipline and to

discharge; and (3) a comparison of the authority afforded British
tribunals' and American arbitrators to modify an employer's decision to discharge.
After examining these issues in some detail, this article recommends that the United States adopt a comprehensive statute permit-

ting all employees, in a procedurally fair and uniform manner, to
challenge the propriety of their dismissals. In formulating such a

statute, legislators in the United States should critically evaluate the
experiences of the British under their unfair dismissal statute. In
Great Britain, the adherence to an objective standard of reasonable-

ness and, generally, a greater concern with the substantive fairness of
a discharge, would rectify many of the inadequacies now associated

with the operation of the unfair dismissal statute.
1. Industrial tribunals, under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act,
1978, provide a first-tier review of the fairness of an employer's decision to discipline.
See Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 67 [hereinafter cited as
EPCA]. Pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary of State for Employment, an
industrial tribunal consists of three persons, a legal chairperson and two laypersons.
Both management and labor submit nominations of the laypersons who sit on an industrial tribunal, and there will be a layperson representative from both sides at the hearings, except in exceptional cases. See EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 128. The members of the
tribunals, of course, have an expertise in industrial relations. Parliament apparently presumed that a familiarity with problems in labor relations would be more likely to satisfy
the parties and would provide "a more competent body to review the employer's discretion." Elias, Fairnessin UnfairDismissaL" Trends and Tensions, 10 INDUS. L.J. 201, 202
(1981). For a discussion of the origins of the English tribunal system, see C. GRUNFELD,
THE LAW OF REDUNDANCY 258-63 (1971); and ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS
AND EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS 1965-1968, REPORT, CMB, 3623 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as DoNovAN REPORT].

The Employment Appeal Tribunal [hereinafter referred to as EAT] has jurisdiction to
review questions of law "arising from any decision of, or arising in any proceeding
before, an industrial tribunal." EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 136(1). The EAT consists of a
High Court judge and laypersons with "special knowledge or experience in industrial
relations, either as representatives of employers or as representatives of workers."
EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 135(3). The role of the EAT in unfair dismissal cases is largely a
function of the willingness of the EAT to intervene insofar as "fairness is most accurately
described as a mixed question of law and fact." Elias, supra at 203.
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I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH STATUTORY LAW
REGULATING UNFAIR

DISMISSALS

The British legislators formulated their unfair dismissal legislathe background of the industrial strife of the 1960's. The
against
tion
large number of employee lay-offs occurring in Great Britain during
the early 1960's led to the passage of the Redundancy Payment Act
(RPA) in 1965. 2 The RPA attempted to attenuate the industrial conflict associated with those massive lay-offs by giving a discharged
employee a lump-sum payment as compensation for the loss of his
job. Industrial strife in Great Britain continued despite the RPA,
however, with some 2,196 unofficial strikes reported between 1964
and 1966. 3 Parliament established the Royal Commission on Trade
Unions and Employers' Associations to discern the causes of this
pronounced increase in industrial strife, including the causes of the
dramatic increase in the number of unofficial strikes.4 The Commission, commenting on the increase in the number of strikes, noted
that a "right to secure a speedy and impartial decision on the justification for a dismissal might have averted many of these [work] stoppages."' 5 The Commission also recommended the enactment of
nationwide legislation providing employees with protection from
unjust dismissals. 6 Such legislation, the Commission concluded,
should avoid the harshness that is characteristic of the common law
of wrongful dismissal, while providing better protection for employees and promoting "the 'rule of law' in what was increasingly seen to
2. The EPCA incorporated the redundancy provisions of the 1965 Act. See EPCA,
1978, ch. 44, § 81. Under the 1978 Act, redundancy exists when an employee loses work

because the employer has completely closed down his business, a particular aspect
thereof, or when work of a particular kind is no longer necessary to the production process. Perhaps the most common example of redundancy occurs when new machinery
replaces a worker in the production process. For a discussion of the British law on
redundancy, see C. GRUNFELD, supra note I.
3. See DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 101. See also Collins, CapitalistDiscipline and CorporationistLaw-Part , 11 INDuS. L.J. 78, 87 (1982).
4. See DONovAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 101.
5. Id at 143.
6. Id at 146. The Commission members carefully weighed the comparative advantages and disadvantages of legislative action. They concluded that legislative action
would provide employers with an incentive "to see that dismissals are carried out under a

proper and orderly procedure." Id at 143. Most importantly, the Commission members
observed that legislative action had "the immediate advantage of making possible an

immediate raising of standards to a much more satisfactory level." Id

Finally, the

Commission noted that legislation would provide employees with a broader range of
remedies and would provide protection for employees in industries where voluntary

methods of resolving industrial dispute currently are ineffective (in smaller businesses
and in poorly organized industries, for example). Id at 145-46.
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be an embattled field where the law had an inadequate presence." '7
In response to the recommendations of the Commission, the
Industrial Relations Act, 1971, included provisions regulating unfair
dismissal. The Trade Union Labor Relations Act, 1974, repealed
many of the provisions of the 1971 Act, but retained the provisions

relating to unfair dismissal. The Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, (EPCA) currently embodies the 1974 provisions

relating to unfair dismissal.8 Section 67 of the EPCA provides that
any employee protected by the Act may present a complaint to an

industrial tribunal within three months of his termination date. At a
hearing on the complaint, the tribunal will inquire into the "fairness" of the dismissal. A determination of "fairness" involves two
inquiries. First, the employer must establish a valid reason for the
dismissal. The statute expressly recognizes as valid the following
reasons for dismissal: redundancy; 9 the inability of an employee to
perform his work; the conduct of an employee; when continued

employment would violate some other statutory enactment; and
when "some other substantial reason" exists for the dismissal. 10 Second, if the employer provides a valid reason for dismissal, the tribu-

nal then must determine, without placing the burden of proof on
either party, whether the employer acted "reasonably or unreasonably" by discharging the employee. If the tribunal finds the discharge
to be unfair, it must then consider whether reinstatement, re-engagement, or compensation is the proper remedy for the dismissal. 1' The
7. See P.

DAVIES

& M.

FREEDLAND, LABOUR LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS

346-48

(1979). Prior to the enactment of the unjust dismissal legislation in 1971, an employer
was required to provide his employee only with notice of the termination of the employment relationship, i.e., the employer was not required to provide a reason for the termination. An employer's failure to provide an employee with adequate notice meant that
the employee had been wronguly dismLrsed. The employment contract could define the
parameters of "adequate notice," so long as it was not less than the statutory minimum of
one week after four weeks of employment, and, thereafter, one week for every completed
year of employment, up to a maximum notice period of 12 weeks. Employees who had
been wrongfully dismissed could seek compensation for their losses. Although the cause
of action for wrongful dismissal survives the enactment of the unfair dismissal legislation, this legislation renders superfluous the former cause of action in the vast majority of
cases. See DONOVAN REPORT, .surpra note 1, at 141. Because of the defacto limitations
on compensation in unfair dismissal cases, however, an action for wrongful dismissal
remains an attractive alternative for higher paid employees.
8. See EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 54-80. See also Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, §§ 610; and Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, § 2-9.
9. See supra note 2.
10. See EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 57. The phrase for "some other substantial reason" is
interpreted very broadly, and is not construed ejusdem generis with the other reasons for
dismissal. See R.S. Components v. Irwin, [1973] Indus. C. Rep. 535. See generally Bowers and Clarke, UnfairDismissalandManagerialPrerogative:AStudy of "OtherSubstantialReason," 10 INDUS. L.J. 34 (1981).
11. See EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 57 & 68. Reinstatement places an employee in the
position he would be in if he had never been dismissed. Consequently, the reinstated

1983]

REASONABLENESS AND JUST CA USE

existence of a statute recognizing the right of an employee to insist

upon a valid reason for discharge, and the concomitant remedies
that are available if the tribunal finds that the discharge was unfair,

represent clear advances over the common law of wrongful
dismissal.' 2
B.

THE FOUNDATIONS AND EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF UNJUST
DISMISSAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

The employment-at-will doctrine, a product of formalistic contract doctrines and laissezfaire economic theory, 13 traditionally has

been an important structural feature of the employment relationship
in the United States. The doctrine provides that, absent specific con-

tractual limitations, an employer is free to "discharge an employee
employee, upon reinstatement, would receive the benefit of any pay increase that he
would have received had he remained in employment. The re-engaged employee, on the
other hand, is given employment comparable to that from which he was discharged with
his former employer, an associated employer, or some other employer. More importantly, under the re-engagement remedy, the tribunals determine the terms of employment, and these terms need not include the restoration of privileges lost because of the
unjust dismissal. See Id § 69. See also infra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
12. The remedies aspect of the legislation, however, from the point of view of an
employee, has been disappointing. The remedies that would put the unjustly discharged
employee back to work or provide substantial compensation admittedly appear to represent an advancement in employee security. Industrial tribunals, however, rarely utilize
the re-employment remedies, and the median compensation award in 1981 was only
£963. See infra notes 161-78 an accompanying text.
Although generally recognized as an advancement in the industrial relations area,
there have been several recent modifications to laws in the unjust dismissal area. In
1980, for example, Parliament modified the applicability of the unjust dismissal law to
small businesses. Following the enactment of the 1971 Act, the representatives of small
business alleged that the right to claim unfair dismissal presented yet another obstacle to
the operation of an efficient and competitive business. The 1980 Act, enacted by the
Conservative Government, responded to these objections by requiring that employees
working for an employer with no more than 20 employees must have two years of service
before possessing the right to claim unjust dismissal. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 8.
For a discussion of another modification of the unjust dismissal law in the 1980 Act, see
infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text concerning the so-called neutral burden of
proof.
13. The laissezfaire ideology provided that employers had a "fundamental right" to
discharge employees as they pleased. See Note, Implied ContractRights to Job Security,
26 STAN. L. REv.335, 343 (1974). Formalistic contract doctrines, such as mutuality of
obligation, the statute of frauds and consideration all provided convenient analytical avenues through which courts and commentators could legitimize the employment-at-will
doctrine. Id at 342. Despite the doubtful support and historical justification for the rule,
the employer's "unrestrained freedom to discharge was transmuted into a constitutional
right." See Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time For a Statute, 62 VA. L. Rav. 481, 485 (1976). In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal statute which prohibited the discharge of
a railroad employee because of union membership. Although the Court abandoned the
constitutional rulings of this case in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), the "common law rule stubbornly survives." Summers, supra at 486.

6

CORATELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:1

for a good cause, a bad cause, or no cause at all."'14
Several developments in the law on unfair dismissal in the

United States, however, challenge the continued vitality of the
employment-at-will doctrine. First, many federal and state statutes

prohibit employers from dismissing employees for certain specified
reasons, such as race, color, sex, age, or national origin.' 5 Second,
the judiciary has been active in limiting the discretion of an

employer in dismissal cases. Some state courts, for example, entertaining actions brought by employees alleging that their employer
breached a contract by dismissing them, utilize implied covenants of
good faith and fair dealing in order to limit the operation of the
employment-at-will doctrine.16 Other courts find employers liable in

tort for violating public policy when they discharge employees without a valid cause.17 Finally, under most grievance arbitration procedures in the United States, an employer cannot dismiss an employee
14. Note, supra note 13, at 335. The doctrine became widely accepted following the
publication of Horace Gray Wood's treatise on employment relations. See H. WOOD,
MASTER AND SERVANT 277-81 (2d ed. 1886). See also Note, supra note 13, at 340-43.
15. The federal acts that protect employees from dismissal for these specified reasons
include: National Labor Relation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) (union activity protected); Employment Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1976) (race, sex,
national origin, religion); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 (1976) (age); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)
(1976) (filing complaint with or otherwise causing the Occupational Safety and Health
Commission to investigate or institute proceedings against an employer); and Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976) (garnishment of wages). For a survey
of state laws protecting employees from unfair dismissals, see Summers, supra note 13, at
495.
16. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974),
where the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that an employer breaches an employment contract if the motivation for the dismissal is bad faith, malice, retaliation, or is not
in the best interests of the economic system or for the public good. 316 A.2d at 551. The
New Hampshire Supreme Court has recently retreated from Monge, however, holding it
applicable only "to a situation where the employee was discharged because he performed
an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy
would condemn." Howard v. Dorr Woolen Company, 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273,
1274 (1980). The Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted the Monge test in Fortune v.
The National Cash Register Company, 373 Mass. 96, 105-06, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257-58
(1977), where it held that the dismissal of a salesman prior to the payment of his commissions constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
17. For example, in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 189, 344
P.2d 25, 27-28 (1959), the employer dismissed an employee for refusing to commit perjury. The court held that the employee's complaint alleged sufficient facts to overcome a
lower court dismissal for failure to state a cause of action in that dismissing an employee
because of his refusal to violate the law imposed civil liability on the employer for any
damages caused to the employee by the dismissal. Other cases include: Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Company, 27 Cal. Rep. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (dismissal for
refusing to participate in an illegal price fixing scheme); Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488
F. Supp. 822 (D.C.N.Y. 1980) (dismissal so as to deprive employee of accrued pension
rights); and Nees v. Hocks, 272 Ore. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (dismissal for serving on a
jury against an employer's wishes).
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unless there is "just cause" for the dismissal. This, of course, is a
direct challenge to the employment-at-will doctrine insofar as an

employer must adhere to the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement concerning the terms and conditions of a bargaining unit

member's employment.

Most collective bargaining agreements

assure that a dismissal is for "just cause only" by providing a multi-

step grievance resolution system that culminates in binding arbitra8

tion between the parties.'
These developments in the law on unjust dismissal in the

United States mitigate some of the harsh consequences associated
with the employment-at-will doctrine. The law, however, remains

inadequate because of its non-systematic nature. For example, nonunionized private-sector employees remain subject to arbitrary dismissals under the employment-at-will doctrine if they fall outside
the protective shield of the aforementioned statutory and judge-

made protections. 19 This situation creates a disparity between the
substantive rights of employees protected by collective bargaining
agreements and those employees who are not so protected. Addi-

tionally, even among employees that are protected by collective bargaining agreements, the nature and scope of the protection need not

be uniform. Arbitration procedures are a product of the specific collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union,
and, naturally, the procedures and protections vary with the agreement. Furthermore, arbitrators are not bound by the decisions of

other arbitrators on issues relating to the interpretation of similar
18. The purpose of a multi-stage grievance procedure is to settle as many grievances
as possible in an informal manner. In the typical grievance procedure, the first step
involves oral communication with the employee's immediate supervisor. If unsuccessful
at this level, the grievant may file a written grievance with the shop steward, who then
meets with a lower-level managerial employee to seek a resolution of the grievance. If
the parties are again unsuccessful, discussion of the grievances may continue at two or
three more stages, each involving higher-level union and management officials. Finally,
if voluntary resolution of the grievance is impossible, the parties may submit the grievance to an arbitrator. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS
120-23 (3d ed. 1973). Express clauses in the contract also may dictate the other specifics
of the arbitration process such as burden of proof, evidentiary standards, and the authority of an arbitrator to modify penalties. Id at 181.
19. One commentator, for example, argues that one-half of all discharges in the nonunionized private sector would be overturned by arbitration if those dicharges were subject to grievance arbitration. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary
Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1979). Peck supports his argument with
references to statistics which show that one-half of all discharges brought to arbitration
by union representatives result in the overturning of management's decision to discipline.
Id For a discussion of public employees and job security, see Weisberger, Job Security
and Public Employees, INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, MONOGRAPH No. 2 (1973)
(as revised in No. 6 (1976), published by New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University.) Public employees are given limited constitutional protection against unjust dismissals by the courts, and also negotiate for job security through
the collective bargaining process.
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contractual provisions.20 This interpretational freedom provides a
potential for further disparities in the substantive rights among
employees working under collective bargaining agreements.

Comprehensive legislation would correct many of the debilitating disparities in substantive rights that currently exist among

employees in the United States. Legislators, lawyers, and academic
commentators, when formulating such legislation, would be well
advised to consult the recent experience of the British under their

unfair dismissal law.2 '
C.

THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIFFERENT ORIGINS OF
THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN LAW ON UNFAIR
DISMISSAL

Many of the differences between the British and the American
law on unfair dismissal are a function of the different sources of the

law. In Great Britain, the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, introduced
statutory provisions regulating unfair dismissal, including the right
of an employee "not to be unfairly dismissed. 2 2u As mentioned

above, however, employees in the United States do not have such
comprehensive legislative protections. Instead, the United States

relies upon a patchwork of federal and state statutes, judge-made
rules, and collective bargaining agreements to protect employees
from an unjustified dismissal. These measures, however, afford only
limited protection. The statutory provisions, for example, regulate
dismissals only for certain unlawful reasons.2 3
Additionally,

although collective bargaining agreements typically provide an
employee with comprehensive protection against dismissal without
cause, these agreements cover fewer than twenty-five percent of all
20. Although it is literally correct to say that arbitration awards have no stare decis/s
effect, in practice, many arbitrators will consider the relevant decisions of other arbitrators in similar cases when reaching their decision. This should come as no surprise, for
one might expect that rational persons will render similar judgments in similar cases. On
the other hand, because one arbitrator's decisions are not binding on other arbitrators,
little effort is made to distinguish cases that, at first glance, seem quite similar. See F.
ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 18, at 365-68.
21. See Collins, supra note 3, at 88-92. Many commentators have called for statutory
reform in this area. See, e.g., Blades, Employment-At- Will v. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting The Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 1404 (1967);
Blumrosen, Stanger v. More: All Workers Are Entitled To Just Cause Protection Under
Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519 (1978); Peck, supra note 17; and Summers, supra note
13.
One of the authors of this article recently has proposed a federal statute, modeled on
the British experience, for protection against unjust dismissal in the United States. See
Mordsley, Lessonsfrom the British Experience, 20 INDUS. L. REL. REP.24 (1982).
22. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 8.
23. See supra note 15.

19831

REASONABLENESS AND JUST CA USE

employees in the United States. 24 Consequently, the first major difference between the British law on unfair dismissal and American
labor arbitration relates to coverage-some ninety-nine percent of
British employees enjoy protection from unfair dismissal, while less
than forty percent of American employees may challenge their dismissal either through arbitration or tenure procedures. 25
Furthermore, the British law, precisely because of its statutory
nature, represents a form of social legislation, providing each individual employee with a right that cannot be waived by the terms of
the employment agreement. 26 In the United States, on the other
hand, the parameters of an employee's right to submit dismissal
cases to arbitration typically remains a function of the consensual
agreement between an employer and an employee's representative,
i.e., the focus is on the employer-union relationship. The rights of an
employee, then, are not guaranteed insofar as they are subject to
negotiation by the employee's representatives.
Finally, the British law on unfair dismissal utilizes a more structured appeals procedure.than the appeals procedures that are characteristic of American labor arbitration. In Great Britain, an employee
alleging unfair dismissal must file a complaint with an industrial tribunal within three months of his dismissal. The decision of an indi24. See Weisberger, supra note 19.
25. It is also of some importance to note that a 1975 survey indicated that 79% of all
collective bargaining agreements contain "cause" or "just cause" for discharge provisions. See Summers, supra note 13, at 499 n.104. Additionally, in 1980, 20.8% of the
American workforce belonged to a union. This represents a decline from 22.3% in 1978.
See 1981 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 253 (BNA 1982).
The remaining 80% of the private-sector workforce in the United States, therefore, has
no unfair dismissal protection, other than the patchwork of federal statutes and judgemade rules mentioned above. For a discussion and proposal of possible federal legislation providing such protection to both unionized and non-unionized employees, see
Summers, supra note 13; and Mordsley, supra note 21.
This article does not attempt to explore other related areas of employee discharge and
discipline, including the protection enjoyed by public sector employees, and voluntary
programs established by private-sector employers to protect against unjust dismissal. Of
approximately 15 million public-sector employees, for example, more than 50% are protected by tenure agreements or other civil service procedural devices. See Peck, supra
note 19, at 8-9. Additionally, some larger employers have introduced voluntary grievance and arbitration procedures. See Littrell, Grievance Procedure andArbitration in a
Nonunion Environment: The Northrop Experience, 34 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 35 (1980) (describing the grievance
procedures adopted by Northrop Aircraft, Inc.).
26. "(1) In every employment to which this section applies every employee shall
have the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer.
(2) This section applies to every employment except in so far as its application is
excluded by or under any provision of this part ....
EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 54. See also id at § 140 which generally prohibits the contracting
out of the right to claim unjust dismissal. An employer and union, however, may contract for and operate their own unfair dismissal procedure with the approval of the Secretary of State for Employment. Id at § 65.
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vidual tribunal, as to matters of law, may be appealed to the
Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT). If the ruling of the EAT fails
to satisfy the complaining employee, leave may be taken to appeal
the decision to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 27 In the
United States, the collective bargaining agreement usually provides
a method for selecting an arbitrator and outlines the grievance procedures to be followed. These procedures vary according to the
requirements of the agreement. Further, in the United States, court
review of an arbitrator's decision remains the exception rather than
the rule, and the agreement28 ordinarily will narrowly circumscribe
the right of judicial review.
This brief examination of the background and structure of the
British and American law on unfair dismissal reveals several of the
broad differences that currently exist between the two systems, This
article now addresses, in greater detail, the similarities and differences in the central concepts and standards used to determine the
appropriateness of a discharge.
II
A COMPARISON OF THE METHODOLOGIES
USED TO DETERMINE THE
APPROPRIATENESS OF A
DISCHARGE
A.

ToWARDS A DEFINITION OF THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS:
"REASONABLENESS"

AND "JUST CAUSE"

The dismissal of an employee in Great Britain is appropriate

only if it is "reasonable"; a dismissal under the arbitration system in
the United States is appropriate only if it is with "just cause." These
words by themselves are of little guidance to either an industrial tribunal or an arbitrator. Various British and American tribunal, court

and arbitration decisions, however, have further defined, and
thereby concretized, the meaning of these terms.
27. Id at §§ 67 & 136.
28. The parties to an arbitration agreement select the arbitrator or arbitrators in various ways. Some collective bargaining agreements contain designations of a "permanent
arbitrator" (i.e., for the life of the collective agreement), or a tripartite board of arbitrators. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 18. Tripartite arbitration panels generally include an impartial chairman selected upon agreement by the parties, and two
members, one selected by management and the other by labor. Id
Parties also may select arbitrators on a "temporary" basis (i.e., for the particular grievance), and many contracts provide for the selection of an arbitrator in accordance with
the rules of the American Arbitration Association. See M. TROTTA, ARBITRATION OF
LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIsPUTEs 37 (1974).
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The British Law on UnfairDismissal: The Reasonableness
Requirement

Section 57 of the EPCA, as modified by the Employment Act,
1980, provides that once an employer establishes a reason for
discharge:
the determination of the question whether the dismissal was fair or unfair,
having regard to the reason shown by the employer, shall depend on whether
in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the
employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in
treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee; and that question shall be2 9determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits
of the case.

Commentators have noted that this statutory test appears to focus
upon the sufficiency of the employer's reason for dismissing the
employee in view of the circumstances that the employer knew or
reasonably should have known at the time of discharge. 30 Similarly,
British courts interpret the reasonableness requirement as involving
consideration of only that employee conduct and those circum31
stances that were known to the employer at the time of dismissal.
In W. Devis & Sons Ltd v. Atkins,32 for example, an employer dismissed an employee for insubordination. The employer offered the
employee a severance pay of six weeks' salary if the employee would
waive the otherwise applicable notice of termination requirement.
The employer also offered the employee a £6,000 ex gratia payment.
Before the employee accepted these offers, however, the employer
discovered that the employee had engaged in dishonest trade practices prior to his termination. The employer then withdrew the settlement offers and notified the employee that he was summarily
dismissed on the basis of the subsequently discovered dishonest conduct. The House of Lords upheld the finding of an unfair dismissal.
The Law Lords ruled that the lower court properly determined the
reasonableness of the dismissal solely on the basis of the evidence
available to the employer at the time of the dismissal. The Law
Lords insisted that this evidence, and not whether the employee
deserved to be discharged because of the subsequently discovered
misconduct, was the proper basis for a determination of the fairness
33
of a discharge.
29. EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 57(3).
30. See S.D. ANDERMAN, UNFAIR DIsMIssALs
supra note 1, at 204.

AND THE LAW

41 (1973); and Elias,

31. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.

32. [1977] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 314.
33. See also Earl v. Slater & Wheeler (Airlyne) Ltd where the test was viewed as

"whether the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating the reason as sufficient for dismissing the employee and it has to be answered with reference to the circum-

stances known to the employer at the moment of dismissal." [1973] All E.R. 145, 150.
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This interpretation of the unfair dismissal legislation appears to
benefit the discharged employee insofar as any subsequently discovered misconduct cannot be considered by a tribunal when adjudging
the fairness of a dismissal. A tribunal will consider this misconduct,
however, in determining the compensation that is owed to the
unjustly dismissed employee. The unfair dismissal legislation provides that "the amount of the compensatory award shall be such
amount as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances. ' 34 In Atkins, for example, the House of Lords interpreted
the predecessor of this section of the 1978 Act as allowing "nil compensation" where the employee successfully concealed grave misconduct.3 5 Although it may seem inconsistent to have an unfair
dismissal and yet award no remedy to the employee, a careful consideration of the underlying policies of the unjust dismissal law supports the rule of the Atkins case. By requiring that the validity of a
dismissal be judged only on information known to the employer at
the time of discharge, the Atkins rule encourages employers to make
a reasonable investigation and to base any dismissal on an adequate
factual foundation. When determining whether reinstatement, reengagement, or compensation is the appropriate remedy for an
unfair dismissal, however, the law should be less concerned with the
facts known to an employer at the time of dismissal, and more concerned that an employee receives his "just desserts." An industrial
tribunal should consider all relevant information when making the
latter determination, including information not available to an
employer at the time of discharge. TheAtkins rule promotes both of
these policies in unfair dismissal cases. Under the Atkins rule, a
finding of unfair dismissal penalizes the employer for improperly
discharging an employee without an adequate factual basis, while
the award of nominal or nil compensation penalizes the employee
36
who engaged in serious misconduct.
InAtkins, the court limited its holding to what it found was the correct statutory interpretation of the 1971 Act, and not what it considered the proper approach regarding
subsequently discovered employee misconduct. Indeed, under the common law of
wrongful discharge, an employer could utilize information discovered after the dismissal
in order to justify the validity of his action. See Boston Deep Sea and Ice Company v.
Ansell, 39 Ch.D. 339, 352 (1888).
34. EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 74(1).
35. In point of fact, the court awarded the employee in Atkins two weeks pay as a
"basic award." Between 1975 and 1980 an employee would receive this minimum compensation whenever there was an unfair dismissal, without regard to the merits of his
claim. This minimum award was later referred to as the "'rogues' charter." It was
repealed by the Employment Act, 1980.
36. The only qualification to this affirmation of the Atkins rule is that an employer
may be insufficiently penalized for his error, and, thereby, may be insufficiently
"encouraged" to improve his ways after a finding of unfair dismissal.
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Commentators on the British law have identified further the
components of the "reasonableness" requirement in dismissal cases.
Anderman, for example, posits three distinct components of reasonableness: (1) the factual basis supporting the employer's decision;
(2) the procedural adequacy of the dismissal process; and (3) the proportionality of the penalty imposed to the offense.3 7 Davies and
Freedland argue that the question involves a balancing of "substantive justice" and "procedural justice.13 8 Elias also recognizes that
the concept of "fairness" necessitates an inquiry into both the "substantive factual adequacy" of a dismissal decision and the "procedural protections" provided in the dismissal process.3 9 In simple
terms, then, to satisfy the test of reasonableness a dismissal must be
both substantively fair and procedurally fair.
An exception to the rule that an employer must base a discharge on facts known at the
time of the discharge recently developed in The Board of Governors, The National Heart
and Chest Hospitals v. Nambiar, [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 196. In Nambiar, the
employee challenged his discharge through the company's internal appeals procedures.
He introduced evidence at the appeals hearings that the medication he was taking for his
diabetes caused the actions that led to his dismissal. The internal appeal failed, and the
employee brought a complaint before an industrial tribunal. The industrial tribunal
found the dismissal unfair because the internal appeals tribunal failed to admit the medical evidence introduced by the employee. The EAT reversed, holding that for purposess
of unfair dismissal proceedings, the discharge was not final until all internal appeals
ended. The EAT ruled that the evidence disclosed at the internal appeals herein, could
be considered by the tribunal.
In considering the effect of this decision on theAtkins rule, it is important to know the
nature of the employer's decision prior to the internal appeal. Has there been a mere
suspension pending the appeal, and is it on full pay?. If so, using information obtained at
the appeal cannot be objectionable. Indeed, the process is more of a fact-finding investigation than an appeal. The use of this evidence is not appropriate if the appeal is against

a final decision to dismiss which already has been made by an employer. By permitting
the use of the appeal to strengthen an employer's reasons for dismissal, the appeal stage
is effectively lost. The tribunal, however, did not make this distinction, as the employer
had decided to dismiss prior to the internal appeal. The EAT justified its decision by
noting that the employer was not substituting a new reason for the dismissal, and, therefore, it was perfectly permissible to take into account information that clarifies the reason
relied upon.
Nambiar is somewhat different from other cases in that the evidence adduced was of
assistance to the employee. There will, of course, be cases where the additional evidence
will assist an employer. In practice, it is impossible to say that the internal appeal body
will ignore evidence that was presented at the appeal but was not known to the employer
at the time of the original dismissal. It must remain the case, however, that an employer
cannot change the reason for dismissal as a result of the internal appeal hearing.
Nambiar, therefore, does not put into question the status of Atkins, but only qualifies
Atkins to the extent that it allows an employer to consider information received after the
decision to dismiss has been made but that is relevant to the reason proffered at the time
of dismissal.
37. See S.D. ANDERMAN, supra note 30, at 41-42.
38. See P. DAvIEs & M. FREEDLAND, supra note 7, at 354-71, particularly at 365-66.

39. See Elias,supra note 1, at 210-11.
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2. Grievance Arbitrationin the United States: The Requirements of
"Just Cause"
The test of the appropriateness of discharge under American
grievance arbitration is similar to the test applied under the British
law. Although articulated in terms of "just cause," arbitrators in the
United States also concentrate on the factual adequacy of the discharge, the procedural protections afforded the employee, and the
relationship between the penalty imposed and the nature of the
offense committed. As one arbitrator stated:
It is ordinarily the function of an Arbitrator in interpreting a contract provision which requires 'sufficient cause' as a condition precedent to discharge
not only to determine whether the employee involved is guilty of wrongdoing and, if so, to confirm the employer's right to discipline where its exercise is essential to the objective of efficiency, but also to safeguard the interests of the discharged employee by making reasonably sure that the causes
for discharge were just and equitable and such as would
appeal to reasonable
4°
and fair-minded persons as warranting discharge.

Another arbitrator developed a list of seven factors to consider in
discharge cases, once again, with the intention of assuring the procedural and substantive fairness of a dismissal. The following questions exemplify these factors: (1) did the employee have knowledge
that his conduct would be subject to discipline, including possible
discharge?; (2) was the rule he violated reasonably related to the
safe, efficient and orderly operation of the business of the company?;
(3) did the company make a reasonable effort, before disciplining the
employee, to discover whether he in fact did violate the rule?; (4) was
the investigation made by the employer fair and objective?; (5) did
the investigation produce substantial evidence that the employee was
guilty of the offense with which he was charged?; (6) was the decision
non-discriminatory?; and (7) was the degree of discipline given him
reasonably related to the seriousness of the proven offense? 4 1
The investigation into whether "just cause" existed for a discharge is confined to the reasons articulated by an employer at the
time of the discharge. As in Great Britain, then, evidence of misconduct that was not known to the employer at the time of discharge
will not justify a discharge. In National Screw & Manufacturing
4 2
Co.,
for example, the employer fired an employee for absenteeism.
At the arbitration hearing, however, the employer sought to introduce evidence showing that, after the discharge, the employee had
40. Riley Stoker Corp., 7 L.A. 764, 767 (1947).
41. See W. BAER, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE UNDER THE LABOR AGREEMENT 29
(1972), wherein Mr. Baer refers to a list of criteria developed by the well-known arbitrator, Carroll B. Daughterty.
42. 33 L.A. 735 (1961).
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been convicted of a statutory rape that had occurred prior to the
discharge. The arbitrator refused to consider the evidence:
At most, the subsequent conviction and particularly the admission of guilt at
the trial, could be considered as corroborative evidence bearing upon the
company's initial appraisal of the employee's conduct. It cannot, however,
in the absence of the
serve to retroactively provide justification for discipline
43
existence of "just cause" prior to the discharge.

The definitions of "just cause" and "reasonableness," therefore,
are strikingly similar. Both concepts compel an employer: (1) to
provide an adequate factual basis for the dismissal; (2) to maintain
the procedural integrity of the dismissal process; and (3) to ensure an
equitable balance between the offense and the penalty. Furthermore, both British tribunals and American arbitrators insist that
employers justify their decision to dismiss on the basis of evidence
that is available to them at the time of discharge. Unlike the British
unfair dismissal law with its statutory definition of fairness, 44 however, there is no clear consensus among arbitrators as to what constitutes a "fair" dismissal. Where a contract is silent on the issue of
disciplinary procedures, for example, some arbitrators will impute a
"just cause" requirement, but other arbitrators claim that management, under these circumstances, has the authority to discharge at
45
will.
Additionally, arbitrators have different views concerning
what constitutes "just cause." One arbitrator stated: "What constitutes just cause is a matter that must be based on the individual merits of the case." 46 Past practice, the history of negotiations between
the parties, and the relative skill of the advocates for both sides also
will influence the meaning assigned to "just cause" in a particular
case. 47 Finally, although arbitrators sometimes will look to the decisions of their colleagues for guidance, they often will disregard rulings in similar cases, preferring to apply their own brand of
industrial justice within the parameters of the collective bargaining
agreement. 48 Thus, although there is a great deal of similarity in the
definitions of "just cause" and "reasonableness," the case-specific
nature of arbitration in the United States provides the potential for a
divergence of opinion amongst arbitrators concerning what consti49
tutes "just cause" in discharge cases.
43.
44.
45.
46.
at 27.

Id at 740.
EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 57.
See F. ELKOURi & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 18, at 611.
Power Equipment Co., 2 L.A. 558, 560 (1945), as cited in W. BAER, supra note 41,

BAER, supra note 41, at 27.
48. Id
49. One should not overstate the distinction between the United States and Great
Britain concerning the meaning of "just cause" versus "fairness." Although there is a
statutory definition of fairness in Great Britain, the view of one industrial tribunal

47. W.
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B. THE DETERMINATION OF REASONABLENESS: THE BRITISH
LAW ON UNFAIR DISMISSAL

Two basic questions emerge in both British and American discharge cases: (1) did the employer have a sufficient basis for disciplining the employee?; and, if so, (2) was discharge the appropriate
penalty for the misconduct or incapability? Although Part IIA of
this article noted the broad similarities in the definitions of "just
cause" and "reasonableness," critical differences do exist in the focal
point for determining whether any disc4line is warranted, and,
assuming that some sort of discipline is called for, whether discharge
is the appropriate penalty. These differences are not merely semantic insofar as recent decisions in Great Britain reveal a trend towards
deference to the judgment of an employer. The trend is in marked
contrast to the de novo review that is characteristic of arbitration in
the United States.
I.

The Establishment of an Adequate FactualBasisfor the
Discolineand Dischargeof an Employee

During the first six to seven years of the British law on unfair
dismissal, industrial tribunals were viewed as "special [juries] adopting a broad approach of common sense and common fairness and
eschewing all legal or other technicalities. ' 50 In Bessenden Properties
Ltd v. Corness,5 for example, the Court of Appeal acknowledged
the validity of this understanding of the role of industrial tribunals.
The court noted that the question of the fairness of a discharge
should be left to the tribunals, and that the tribunals should consider
all relevant circumstances when making this decision. The approach
endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Corness encouraged industrial
tribunals to examine objectively the reason for the discharge, and to
render an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the
52
discharge.
A series of decisions by the EAT in 1976 and 1977, however,
shifted the focus of the initial inquiry that was made by the industrial tribunals. Henceforth, industrial tribunals would not objectively review the reasonableness of an employer's decision to
discipline and discharge an employee, but instead would defer to the
regarding reasonable behavior may be very different from the view of another tribunal,
and the relative skill of the advocates for either side may influence the decision as well.
Furthermore, the decisions of a tribunal are not binding on another tribunal; only the
EAT and the courts of review render decisions which establish binding precedents.
50. See S.D. ANDERMAN, supra note 30, at 39.

51. [1974] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 338.
52. See also Earl v. Slater & Wheeler (Airlyne) Ltd., [1973] 1 All E.R. 145; and St.
Anne's Board Mill Co. v. Brien, [1973] Indus. Cas. R. 444.

1983]

REASONABLENESS AND JUST CAUSE

decision of an employer if there was a reasonable basis for the decision. 53 In Ferodo Ltd v. Barnes,54 an employer dismissed an
employee for vandalism of the company's toilets. The EAT held
that the proper test was not whether the evidence convinced the
industrial tribunal that the employee committed the misconduct, but
whether the employer had reasonable grounds at the time of dismissal to conclude that the employee committed the offense. The EAT
stated that a finding relating to whether or not the employee actually
committed the misconduct was only one relevant factor in determin55
ing whether the employer had reasonable grounds to dismiss.
Similarly, in Vickers Ltd v. Smith, 56 the EAT exhibited an even
more deferential attitude towards employer decisions in dismissal
cases by establishing the "two views doctrine." The "two views doctrine" provides that if a reasonable employer could decide either to
dismiss or retain an employee, either decision would be legally
acceptable to an industrial tribunal. Under this doctrine, then, a tribunal may overrule an employer's decision to dismiss only where
that decision "was so wrong, that no sensible or reasonable management could have arrived at the decision"; 57 the role of the tribunal
under this test is merely to determine whether the action of the
employer was so arbitrary and capricious as to lack any rational support. Although a minority of arbitrators in the United States limit
themselves to this "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, it
clearly is far more deferential than the de novo standard generally
58
applied by arbitrators.
Finally, in Taylor v. AlidairLtd,5 9 the Court of Appeal, by Lord
Denning, affirmed the holdings of Barnes and Smith as to the focal
point for determining the reasonableness of discharge:
In considering the case, it must be remembered that [the statute] contemplated a subjective test. The Tribunal has to consider the employer's reason
and the employer's state of mind. If the company honestly believed on rea53. Because the statutory language regarding dismissal does not explicitly endorse
either understanding of the role of industrial tribunals, the increased deference that has
been afforded to the judgments of management in this area is entirely a result of judicial
construction of the statutory language. See EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 57.
54. [1976] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 302.
55. Id at 303.
56. [1977] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 11.
57. Id at 12. The wide range of discretion granted to employers under the "two
views" doctrine is arguably the harbinger of the "band of reasonableness" test currently
used by British courts to examine the reasonableness of an employer's choice of discharge as a penalty. See infra notes 117-29 and accompanying text. More recent tribunals decisions have retreated, somewhat, from the extreme position announced in Smith.
See Iceland Frozen Foods v. Jones, [1983] Indus. Cas. R. 17; N.C. Watling Co. v. Richardson, [1978] Indus. Cas. R. 1049.
58. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
59. [1978] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 82.
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sonable grounds that this pilot was lacking in proper capability to fly aircraft
reason for the comon behalf of the company, that was a good and sufficient
60
pany to terminate the employment then and there.

The incrieasing deference afforded the actions of employers in
unjust dismissal cases may lead to the dismissal of an employee on
the basis of prejudice rather than objective fact. Saunders v. Scottish
NationalCamps6 ' illustrates this potential problem. In Saunders, an
employer dismissed a maintenance employee who worked at a camp
"attended by young persons of both sexes" because the employee
was a homosexual. A psychiatrist, testifying for the employee, stated
that he did not think that the employee's homosexuality created a
danger to young people. He admitted, however, that many employers probably believed, without any scientific basis, that homosexuals
may "interfere" with children. After noting this evidence, the EAT
concluded that "[there is considerable support for the judgment that]
employers would take the view that the employment of a homosexual should be restricted, particularly when required to work with
children."' 62 The EAT then upheld the tribunal decision to permit
dismissal.
Thus, the refusal of the EAT to evaluate objectively the adequacy of the facts supporting the dismissal permitted the employer to
discharge an employee because of employer beliefs regarding the
dangerousness of homosexuals. The decision in Saunders led one
commentator to warn that "[t]his is a dangerous development, for if
this kind of argument becomes widely accepted it will result in reasonableness being defined by the attitudes of the most prejudiced
body of employers rather than by the Tribunal's perception of how
63
an enlightened employer might behave."
This deference to the decisions of an employer also applies in
cases concerning the choice of disciplinary measures. Under the
"range of responses" doctrine, first articulated in Rolls Royce Ltd v.
Wa/pole, 64 an industrial tribunal may not substitute its own views in
considering the appropriateness of discharge as the penalty for that
of an employer for employee misconduct. As the EAT stated in
Wa/pole:
60. Id at 84.
61. [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 174, aft'd, [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 277.
62. Id at 175. That is, in assessing the reasonableness of the employer's belief
regarding homosexuals, the EAT was not concerned with scientific evidence as much as
with whether most employers probably believed that homosexuals should not work with
children.
63. See Elias, supra note 1, at 213.
64. [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 343. For a discussion which is critical of the "range of
responses" doctrine, see Collins, CapitalistDiscipineand CorporationistLaw-PartII, 11
INDUS. LJ. 170, 173-74 (1982).
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Frequently there is a range of responses to conduct or capacity of an
employee on the part of the employer, from and including summary dismissal downwards to a mere formal warning, which can be said to have been
reasonable. It is precisely because this range of possible responses does exist
in many cases that it has been laid down that it is neither for us on an appeal,
nor for an Industrial Tribunal on the original hearing, to substitute65ours or its
respective views for those of the particular employer concerned.

The Court of Appeal endorsed this test in British Leyland UK Ltd v.
Swift, 66 where an employer dismissed an employee for having a
company registration on his personal vehicle. The industrial tribunal held that the dismissal was unfair in view of the employee's long
work record, the minor nature of the offense, and the fact that the
employee had already been punished through the criminal justice
system. The EAT agreed with the industrial tribunal, but the Court
of Appeal reversed, noting that the question is not whether a lesser
penalty is appropriate, but whether dismissal falls within that "band
of reasonableness within which one employer might reasonably take
one view . . . [and] another quite reasonably take a different
67
view."
What is the reason for this increasing deference towards
employer decisions in dismissal cases? One purported explanation
for this development is that the current reasonableness test testifies to
the importance of an employer's continued confidence in his
employees. Although factual guilt is the critical issue in the criminal
justice system, it is less important in the industrial relations system.
The proponents of this position maintain that an employer must
remain confident in the loyalty, honesty and ability of his employees.
If an employer believes that an employee is a thief, for example, that
relationship as
belief may be as destructive of the employment
68
employee.
the
of
guilt
actual
would be the
This justification for the recent developments in the British law
on unfair dismissal, 69 however, is valid only if the typical result of a
finding of unfair dismissal is the reinstatement of the factually innocent but currently mistrusted employee. Reinstatement is the pri65. [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 346.
66. [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 91.
67. Id at 92.
68. The case of Ferodo Ltd v. Barnes illustrates this position. The employer suspected an employee of vandalism in the company toilets, and dismissed him based upon
these suspicions. The EAT recognized the importance of this loss of confidence in the
employee, and stated that the proper test for adjudging the fairness of dismissal as a
penalty was not whether the employee actually committed the offense, but whether the
employer could reasonably believe that the employee committed the misconduct. Hence,
a tribunal must ask only whether they are "satisfied that the employer had. . . reason-

able grounds for believing that the offense.
L. Rep. 302, 303.

. . was

committed." See [1976] Indus. Rel.

69. See supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
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mary statutory remedy available to unfairly dismissed employees; 70
in practice, 7' however, compensation remains the remedy most often
granted in unfair dismissal cases. 72 If compensation rather than
reinstatement is the primary remedy afforded to unfairly dismissed
employees, the subjective reasonableness of an employer's decision
is less important than the objective guilt of an employee. Further, if
it is unlikely that a finding of unfair dismissal will re-establish the
employment relationship, a tribunal should concern itself only with
the factual guilt of an employee.
Although recent developments in the law indicate that tribunals
defer to the plausible judgments of an employer in determining both
whether any discipline is appropriate and what discipline is appropriate, some vestiges of objective analysis remain. An examination
of the actual analysis used by industrial tribunals in dismissal cases
involving misconduct will illustrate this point.
2

The ReasonablenessRequirement andthe Decision to Discipline

As mentioned above, a determination of "reasonableness"
involves an inquiry into the sufficiency of the reason for the discharge, as well as an examination of the appropriateness of the
choice of discharge as a penalty. The three-stage test announced in
British Home Stores Ltd v. Burche17 3 provides the proper mode of

analysis for determining the appropriateness of the choice to discipline an employee in misconduct cases. In Burchell, an employer
dismissed an employee for dishonesty. The industrial tribunal found
the dismissal unfair on the ground that the employer did not prove
that the employee actually committed the misconduct. The EAT
reversed the tribunal, however, noting that the proper test was
"whether the employer who discharged the employee on the grounds
of the misconduct in question

.

.

entertained a reasonable suspi-

cion amounting to a belief in the guilt of the employee of that misconduct at that time". 74 The Burchell court further defined the mode
of analyzing the reasonableness of an employer's belief as involving
(1) whether the employer subjectively believed that the employee
committed the misconduct; (2) whether the employer based that
belief on reasonable grounds which he considered at the time of discharge; and (3) whether the employer conducted a reasonable investigation into the circumstances surrounding the discharge and,
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 68(1).
See infra note 162.
See infra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
[1978] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 379.
Id at 380.
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thereby, verified his belief.75
a.

The Existence of an Employer's Subjective Belief

The easiest part of the Burchelltest for an employer to satisfy is
the existence of his subjective belief. Under section 57 of the Act, an
employer must "show. . . the reason. . . for the dismissal," i.e., the
employer has the burden of going forward. 7 6 An employer who
complies with the requirements of section 57 also establishes a basis
for the existence of his subjective belief under this first-prong of the
Burchell test. Because industrial tribunals lack the authority to construct their own justification for the dismissal from the evidence
brought before it, the employer must articulate this reason for the
dismissal at the initial hearing. An employer, however, may change
the reason or legal justification for the dismissal between the time of
discharge and the commencement of the hearings, provided that the
second reason emerges from the same set of facts as did the first
77
reason.
In Abernethy v. Mott, Hay and Anderson,78 for example, the
employer dismissed a civil engineer for redundancy. 79 At the formal
hearing on the unfair dismissal complaint, however, the employer
abandoned the redundancy claim and asserted the employee's incapability for employment. The Court of Appeal upheld the validity
of the discharge, and ruled that the statute does not require an
employer to label correctly the reason for the discharge, although,
after Atkins,8 0 an employer must rely on evidence known at the time
of discharge. Consequently, Abernethy does not permit an employer
to alter the factual justification for the decision to discipline.
Instead, the Court of Appeal inAbernethy permitted the employer to
change only the justificatory reason precisely because the same factual basis supported both causes of action, i.e., the employee could
75. Id. at 380. The Court of Appeal recently adopted the Burchell test. In W. Weddel & Co. v. Tepper, [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 96, an employee was dismissed for theft,
but was not given an opportunity to defend himself at a hearing. The court held that,
under the Burchell test, the failure to provide the employee with an opportunity to clear
his name was an unreasonable investigation under part three of the test. Id at 98. See
also infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
76. EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 57(l)(a).
77. But cf Nelson v. The British Broadcasting Corp., where the employer allegedly
dismissed the employee for redundancy. See supra note 2. Although it had doubts as to
the alleged redundancy justification, the EAT nevertheless upheld the discharge because
it concluded that the employer could have established "some other substantial reason"
for the discharge. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the tribunal and EAT
erred as a matter of law in considering any other reason than the reason proffered by the
employer. [1977] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 148, 151. See also infra note 81.
78. [1974] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 213.
79. See supra note 2.
80. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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not perform the work that the employer had available. 8 ' Under
these circumstances, the employee was not prejudiced because he
knew the factual basis for the discharge, and could prepare his
defense accordingly.
b.

Proof of a Reasonable Basis for an Employer's Subjective Belief

The burden of showing a reasonable basis for discharge
remained on the employer between 1974 and 1980.82 During those
years, an employer had the burden of establishing a reason for dis-

missal, and of proving by a "balance of the probabilities" that the

discharge was "reasonable" in view of the circumstances.8 3 The
Employment Act, 1980, however, returned to the "in the air" onus of
proof found in the 1971 unfair dismissal legislation. 84 The burden of

showing a reasonable basis for discharge, therefore, is neutral, and
once the employer establishes any reason for the dismissal, it is left
to the industrial tribunal to assess the evidence offered by the parties
and to determine whether the discharge was reasonable.
Several British commentators presently are debating whether

this change in the law will result in any material differences in practice. Gwyneth Pitt, for example, argues that the change will have

serious consequences.8 5 Pitt observes that, at the time it was
adopted, the shift from the "in the air" onus of proof in the 1971 Act
to a standard that placed the burden on the employer in the Trade
Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, was recognized as being an

"important change. '86 When the employer has the burden of proof,
81. In Nelson v. The British BroadcastingCorp., for example, the parties agreed that
the employer had ceased operations as defined in the statute, but disagreed as to the
construction of the terms of the contract of employment. To the extent that this can be
characterized as a mistake of law, the employer's reason for dismissal arguably falls
under the Abernethy doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal found that the
employer's incorrect choice of a reason for dismissal was more than a legal technicality,
and upheld the employee's claim. [1977] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 148.
82. See Trade Union Labor Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, sch. 1; EPCA, 1978, ch. 44,
§ 57(3).
83. See, e.g., Ferodo Ltd. v. Barnes, [1976] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 302, where the EAT
observed that "the burden is placed upon the employer to show that the reason was a
justifiable one." Id at 303.
84. See Industrial Relation Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 24(l). The 1980 Act provides:
Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), then, subject to sections 58 to 62, the determination of the question whether the dismissal
was fair or unfair, having regard to the reason shown by the employer, shall
depend on whether in the circumstances (including the size and adminstrative
resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or
unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee; and
the question shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial
merits of the casse.
Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 6.
85. Pitt, Individual Rights Under the New Legislation, 9 INDUS. L.J. 233 (1980).
86. Id at 234.
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Pitt argues, a tribunal which was not satisfied with the quantum or
credibility of the employer's proof, even if it was the only evidence
presented, could find that a dismissal was unfair solely on the
grounds that the employer failed to meet his onus of proof.87 After
the change in the Employment Act, 1980, however, because an
employer need only establish a reason for the discharge, a tribunal
may find it more difficult to declare a dismissal unfair solely because

the quantum of proof does not satisfy the tribunal.88

Pitt also argues that a reversion to a neutral burden of proof
may alter the procedures presently used by tribunals. 89 Instead of
requiring an employer to proceed first on the question of reasonable-

ness, a tribunal may instruct the employee to proceed first, even
though the relevant facts in dismissal cases often are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the employer. 90
On the other hand, other commentators insist that the change
enacted in 1980 will make little difference in the outcome of unfair
dismissal cases. Patrick Mayhew, the former Under Secretary of
State for Employment, stated that "in terms of law the clause will
have little effect." 9 1 Because the employer still has the burden of
establishing a reason for the dismissal under Section 57(1) of the
87. See, e.g., Day v. Diemer & Reynolds, Ltd., [1975] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 298. In
Day, an employer, a publisher, dismissed an employee for improperly conducting his
book binding duties. There was conflicting testimony as to whether the employee was
responsible for the product defects. The industrial tribunal observed that:
Although it is not very satisfactory to come back to the onus of proof, the position is that the Tribunal is not satisfied that the [employer's] version is correct.
We are not saying that it is incorrect. It is just that we are not satisfied one way
or the other. . . . The onus is on the [employer] to satisfy us that [he] acted
reasonably and [he has] failed... on this particular point.
Id at 301.
88. It is quite possible, for example, that the result in Day would be different if the
neutral burden rule was in effect.
89. See Pitt, supra note 85, at 234-35.
90. It is doubtful, however, that a tribunal would permit an employer to remain
silent where the employer is either the only or the primary source of information concerning the dismissal. Nonetheless, there is no sound reason for introducing uncertainty
into this area of the law. As Pitt observes,
The facts are peculiarly within the employer's knowledge, and an employee
starting first would be seriously disadvantaged by having to try to foresee and
deal with all possible points which might be raised, an impossible task for the
unrepresented applicant. Beginning is far less of a disadvantage for the
employer, partly because he is far more likely to have legal representation than
the employee, and partly because under the 1980 Regulations, the respondent
can ask for further and better particulars before entering his notice of appearance, so that there can be no excuse for his being uninformed about the substance of the applicant's case.
Id at 235.
91. Mr. Mayhew observed, however, that "'in terms of psychology it [the shift to a
neutral burden of proof] will have a significant effect,' meaning that employers will no
longer feel that they are having to prove themselves innocent." See Pitt, supra note 85, at
234.
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EPCA, it is likely that the employer will present all the relevant eviwhatever evidence
dence in order to meet that burden, including
92
exists on the question of reasonableness.
Regardless of the impact that this shift in the burden of proof

may have on the outcome of unfair dismissal cases, the tribunal still
must find that a reasonable basis existed for the decision to discipline. In Burchell, the EAT articulated the test as whether the evidence, by a "balance of the probabilities," allowed the employer to

"entertain a reasonable suspicion amounting to a belief in the guilt

of the employee of that misconduct at that time."' 93 The tribunal
may not ask whether the evidence establishes "beyond a reasonable
doubt" that the employee committed the offense; nor, from an objective standpoint, should the tribunal assess whether the evidence

demonstrates by a "balance of the probabilities" that the employee
committed the offense. 94 Instead, the law limits the inquiry of the
tribunal to the issue of whether the evidence supports the employer's
"reasonable suspicions," i.e., as the EAT stated in Ferodo Ltd v.
Barnes,95 whether or not the employee actually committed the

offense is currently only one factor to96 examine in determining
whether the employer acted reasonably.

92. Although the new provision has been in operation for nearly three years, its true
unclear. It is possible that the change was merely cosmetic, designed to
effect is still
manage the complaints of aggravated employers regarding the unfair dismissal laws in
general. See Pitt, supra note 85, at 234. Problematic cases, however, may arise. In the
1976 decision of Bristol Channel Ship Repairers Ltd. v. O'Keefe, [1977] Indus. Cas. R.
492, for example, the EAT held a dismissal for redundancy unfair because the employer
failed to show who had made the actual decision to dismiss the employees, what information they had relied upon, and what criteria they had used in making their decision.
One questions whether this dismissal would be held unfair under the current neutral
burden of proof standard. The employer merely would prove that the redundancies were
necessary for business reasons, and, thereby, would satisfy the requirement of showing a
reason for dismissal. If the employer then rested, as it did in the Bristol Channel case, the
tribunal would have to determine, with only the information that the employer provided,
whether the decision to dismiss was reasonable. Although it is submitted that all reasonable tribunals would require the employer to come forward with evidence of its procedures, such a result should be required as a matter of law.
93. [1978] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 380.
94. Id at 380.
95. [1976] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 302.
96. Id at 303.
The Burchell test does not apply to conduct involving at least two employees. Where
there is a "reasonable suspicion" that one of two or possibly both employees have acted
dishonestly, the employer does not have to establish that he subjectively believes them
both to be guilty. In Monlie v. Coral Racing Ltd., [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 464, for
example, an employer discovered money missing from a safe. Because only two employees had the combination to the safe, the employer fired both of them. The Court of
Appeal upheld the dismissal, and Stephenson, L.J. discussed the applicability of
Burchelf:
To treat belief in the guilt of the particular employee as applicable to a situation
in which an employer finds himself reasonably believing in the guilt of one or
more of two or more employees but unable in fairness to decide which of them is
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An Employer's

Obligation to Conduct a Reasonable

Investigation
It is important to maintain the procedural integrity of unfair
dismissal proceedings for two reasons. First, by providing proce-

dures relating to such matters as adequate notice, an opportunity to
be heard, cross-examination, and appeals, unfair dismissal proceedings should produce objectively more accurate results. Second,

employees are more likely to accept the legitimacy of disciplinary
measures emerging from hearings that are conducted in a procedurally fair manner. That is, the opportunity to present one's case,
whether or not one is ultimately successful on the merits, often estab-

lishes an objective sense of fairness that is not necessarily associated
with ad hoc disciplinary actions.
The British law on unfair dismissal traditionally has insisted

upon strict adherence to the requirements of procedural fairness
when considering the reasonableness of a discharge. In Earl v. Slater
& Wheeler (Airtvne) Ltd, 97 for example, the court held that a dismissal for misconduct wasper se unfair if the employee was not given

an opportunity to state his case, unless "there can be no explanation
which would cause the employers to refrain from dismissing the
employee".9 8 This standard, which came to be known as the "inconceivability test," 99 made it very difficult for an employer to prove

that providing an employee with an opportunity to "state his case"
would make no difference in the outcome of a dismissal hearing.
Similarly, the 1980 Code ofPracticeforDisciplinaryPracticeand

Proceduresin Employment, a publication of the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service, recognizes the importance of maintaining the procedural integrity of disciplinary proceedings, and
provides employers with a list of suggested procedures in dismissal
guilty is to pervert a valuable guideline . . . in a way . . . which constrains
Tribunals to decide cases contrary to justice and equity and to the letter and
spirit of the statute.
Id at 471. Similarly, in McPhie and McDermott v. Wimpey Waste Management Ltd.,
[1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 316, one of the employer's trucks was damaged because of a
failure to put transmission oil in the crankcase. Two mechanics had signed reports stating that they had "topped off" the oil only eleven days earlier. The employer fired both
employees, and the EAT ruled that the dismissal was fair. Stating first that the "balance
of probabilities" test does not require that the employer prove that the gearbox stayed
under constant supervision for all eleven days, the EAT then held that where a tribunal
finds that the employer is convinced that misconduct occurred, that only one or both of
the employees could have committed the misconduct, and that the employer conducted
adequate investigations into the possible liability of both employees, then the dismissal of
both is fair. Cf. infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
97. [1973] 1 All E.R. 145.
98. Id at 149.
99. See Elias, supra note 1, at 214.
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cases.I °° The Code of Practice does not bind employers to any particular procedures, but industrial tribunals often look to the Code of
Practice for guidance and standards in order to ascertain whether
the procedures implemented by an employer meet the "reasonable
investigation" requirement under the third-prong of the Burchell
test. In W. Weddel& Co. Ltd v. Tepper, 101 for example, the Court of
Appeal ruled that the dismissal for an alleged theft was unfair
because, contrary to the Code of Practice,the employer had not provided the discharged employee with an adequate opportunity to
defend himself. The court determined that the employer did not
conduct a "reasonable investigation," as required by Burchell,
because he failed to provide the employee with an opportunity to be
heard.102
A number of recent cases, however, have limited some of the
procedural protections traditionally afforded employees in unfair
dismissal cases. First, in Walton v. TAC Construction Materials
Ltd, 103 the EAT replaced the "inconceivability test" with the "balance of probabilities test." The Tribunal found that "it is now established that if it is shown on a balance of probabilities that such an
investigation would have produced exactly the same result, then the
dismissal does not become unfair just because of a failure to investigate."'0 Additionally, in Hollister v. The National Farmers
Union, 105 the Court of Appeal rejected the reasoning of two earlier
cases that had held that, as a general rule, the failure to follow fair
dismissal procedures wasper se unfair.' °6 In Hollister an employee
was dismissed after he refused to agree to a change in the terms and
100. See Code of Practice,DiscpllinaryPracticeand Proceduresin Employment, paras.
9-10, (Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service, 1977). The Code ofPractice is not
legally binding, but it is admissible as evidence and its provisions may be considered in
determining liability. See Employment Protection Act 1975, ch. 71, § 6(11); Employment
Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 3(8). See also infra note 109.
101. [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 96.
102. "Agreeing as I do with the submissions accepted by the Employment Appeal
Tribunal that the Industrial Tribunal was entitled to conclude on the evidence that there
had been an unreasonable departure from fair procedure, and that is fortified by the
failure of the employers to comply with the Code of Practice or to notify the employee of
" [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 100. See also Ferodo Ltd. v.
his right to appeal ....
Barnes, [1976] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 302, 303 (EAT refers to the "appropriate procedures
.
enshrined in the Code of Practice ...
103. [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 357.
104. Id at 359. This proposition was first formulated in British Labour Pump v.
Byrne, [1979] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 74, and was approved by the Court of Appeal in Wass
v. Binns, [1982] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 283. But Sf. the recent holding by the EAT in Sillifant v. Powell Duffryn Timber Ltd., [1983] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 91.
105. [1979] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 238.
106. See Kelly v. Upholstery & Cabinet Works (Amesburg) Ltd., [1977] Indus. Rel. L.
Rep. 91, 93 ("generally speaking it is unfair to dismiss employees for redundancy without
prior warning or consultation."); and Lowdnes v. Specialist Engineering Ltd., [1976]
Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 246, 247 ("No doubt, as a general rule, a failure to follow a fair
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conditions of his employment contract following a reorganization of

the operations of the employer. 0 7 An industrial tribunal found that
the dismissal was unfair because the employer had not consulted the
employee about the changes. The Court of Appeal reversed, how-

ever, stating that "[niegotiation is only one of the factors which has
to be taken into account when considering whether a dismissal is fair
or unfair."' 108 Similarly, the Court of Appeal ruled that the failure of
the employer to follow the dismissal procedures was but one factor
relevant to a determination of the reasonableness of discharge. 1 9
Recent cases also create uncertainty on the issue of whether an
employer must follow contractually established internal appeals procedures in discharge cases." 0 The traditional view, as recently
espoused in The Distillers Company (Bottling Services) Ltd v. Gardner, "' is that an employer must follow established procedures or
procedure, whether by warning or by giving an opportunity to be heard before dismissal,
will result in the ensuing dismissal being found unfair.").
107. [1979] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 239.
108. Id at 240.
109. The Court, quoting from Lowdnes, supra note 106, noted that" 'as a general rule,
a failure to follow a fair procedure, whether by warnings or by giving an opportunity to
be heard before dismissal will result in the ensuing dismissal being found to be unfair.'
There is something similar to be found in Kelly Y. Upholstery & Cabinet Works (Amesbury) Ltd [1977] IRLR 91, where somewhat similar words are used. It seems to me that
that would be putting the case far too high. One has to look at all the circumstances of
the case and at whether what the employer did was fair and reasonable in the circumstances prior to the dismissal." [1979] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 240. Indeed, in Hollister,
Lord Denning referred to recommendations in the Code ofPracticeas only a gloss on the
statute, and noted that the words of the statute, and not the Code ofPractice, controlled
the case. Id at 241. Similarly, in Retarded Children's Aid Society Ltd. v. Day, [1978]
Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 128, Lord Denning, speaking for the Court of Appeal, reversed the
EAT's determination that the dismissal of a 19-year old counselor for insubordination
was unfair. Although the employer did not warn the employee that his refusal to accept
the employer's policies would lead to termination, Lord Denning maintained that the
right of the society to ran its centers as it chose mandated that dismissal of the employee
for insubordination be adjudged fair under the statute. The procedural requirements of
the Code ofPractice, then, simply do not apply to every case involving unfair dismissal
allegations. See also supra notes 100-02.
110. An employer, it should be noted, need not provide an internal appeals system to
adjudge dismissal cases. In Shannon Y.Michelin (Belfast) Ltd., for example, the Northern
Ireland Court of Appeal, interpreting a statute that provides employees with protection
against unfair dismissal that is substantively the same as the British law, upheld a discharge even though the company rules did not provide for internal appeals or arbitration.
The court noted that it was not "satisfied that the absence of an appeal on review would
not in itself make a dismissal unfair, nor do I think that an employer could be said to be
unreasonable in failing to create some adhoc appeal or review in the absence of agreements between him and the trade union." [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 505, 507.
Although EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 1(4) requires that employers institute internal appeals
procedures, the legislation provides no meaningful sanction for a failure to institute such
procedures. Tribunals, however, generally frown upon employers who do not use the
suggested disciplinary procedures of the Code ofPractice and the Act. See supra notes
100-02 and accompanying text. Consequently, most employers do institute some type of
multi-step disciplinary proceedings.
111. [1982] Indus. Rel. L .Rep. 47.
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risk a finding of unfair dismissal. In Gardner,the agreed upon disciplinary procedures provided that two warnings for proven misconduct must precede the dismissal of an employee. The employer
dismissed the employee in Gardner, however, without establishing
the validity of the second allegation of misconduct. Under these circumstances, the EAT upheld a finding of unfair dismissal on the
ground that the employer did not follow its established internal
appeals procedures.112
The holding in Bailey v. BP OilKent Refinery Ltd., 13 however,

raises the specter of an exception to this traditional rule in cases
involving blatant employee misconduct. In Bailey, an employer dismissed an employee for abusing the employer's self-certifying sick
leave provisions. The union and the employer agreed to a disciplinary procedure that required the employer to notify the appropriate
union official about any proposed discipline for employee misconduct. After making unsuccessful attempts to contact the official, the
employer dismissed the employee. The EAT ruled that the dismissal
was unfair, reasoning that failure to comply with agreed upon disciplinary procedures wasper se unreasonable. The Court of Appeal
reversed, however, noting that the failure of the employer to follow
agreed upon procedures is only one factor to consider in determining
"reasonableness" under the unjust dismissal legislation. 114
Despite these recent rulings, one should not underestimate the
enduring significance of procedural protections under the British law
112. Id at 50.
113. [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 287.
114. It is quite possible that Bailey represents an aberration rather than a change in
the law on unfair dismissal. A tribunal may reason that the procedural aspects of a
dismissal case are less important in cases involving blatant misconduct by an employee.
Bailey, for example, claimed "that he was sick when in fact he had been in Majorca on
holiday." [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 288.
Despite Bailey's somewhat outrageous conduct, two reasons exist for finding an unfair
dismissal because of a failure to follow internally established procedures even in cases
involving blatant employee misconduct. First, the employer, by agreeing to the procedures, morally, if not legally, obligates himself to follow the procedures. Second, the
employee necessarily relies on the disciplinary procedures agreed to by his employer and
labor representative. When discipline occurs without compliance with specified disciplinary procedures, the employer breaches the bargaining relationship between employer,
union, and employee. Although British unfair dismissal law relates to the individual
employment relationship, and not necessarily to the collective bargaining relationship,
the concerns of both relationships frequently overlap. In this instance, a labor representative bargains for a grievance procedure that is not only for the good of the union, but
primarily for the protection of the individual worker. A breach of such procedures,
therefore, clearly affects the individual employee vis-el-vir his relationship with his
employer. Thus, even if a dismissal would be fair if no agreed upon disciplinary procedure existed, the violation of an agreed upon procedure should render a dismissalper se
unfair.

1983]

1983
EASONABLENESS AND JUST C4 USE

on unfair dismissal.' 5 The traditional rule requiring strict adherence to the requirements of procedural fairness, the use of the procedural protections outlined in the Code of Practice as standards for
assessing the fairness of an employer's dismissal process, and the
existence of the third-prong of the Burchell test (requiring that an
employer conduct a reasonable investigation) all testify to the significance afforded procedures in the current British law. The recent
movement away from strict adherence to these procedural requirements, evinced in cases such as Walton, Hollister and Bailey, however, is disquieting. As noted above, 1 6 the focus of the British law
relating to a determination of the factual adequacy of a dismissal
decision has shifted away from an objective review of the alleged
misconduct by a tribunal, towards a consideration of whether there
is a reasonable basis to support an employer's reasonable suspicions
regarding the misconduct or incapability of an employee. A requirement that employers strictly adhere to disciplinary procedures and
conduct reasonable investigations at least would ensure a high
degree of procedural adequacy and, thereby, would diminish the
impact of the change in the focal point for determining the factual
adequacy of a dismissal. If tribunals require that employers conscientiously follow sound dismissal procedures, employers necessarily
would develop a better record upon which to base their "reasonable
suspicion."
The relaxation of procedural requirements, in conjunction with
the shifting of the focus for a determination of the factual adequacy
of an employer's decision, however, threatens to sacrifice the objectivity of tribunal judgments in unfair dismissal cases. If employers
may excuse their failures to follow suggested dismissal procedures
merely by showing that the same result, on a balance of the
probabilities, would obtain anyway, employees may be dismissed on
the basis of an employer's "reasonable suspicions" formulated
within a potentially inadequate truth-seeking process. Furthermore,
these developments in the British law indicate that an employee may
115. See, e.g., Marley Homecare Lid v. Dutton, where an employer dismissed an
employee for theft seven days after the occurrence of the alleged misconduct. During
those seven days, the employee was not notified of the pending investigation and continued to work at her position as a cashier. When confronted with the allegations, the
employee stated she could not remember the transactions at issue. The EAT upheld a
finding of unfair dismissal on the grounds that, because of the time delay, the employee
was not given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges. The EAT noted that
it was unreasonable to expect a cashier to remember specific transactions one week after
they occurred. [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 380. See also Allders International Ltd. v.
Parkins, [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 68, 70 (a dismissal is unfair if, nine days after an
alleged theft, an employer presents an employee with the option of resigning or calling in
the police.)
116. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
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not be permitted to challenge a dismissal decision on the basis that
he did not, in fact, commit the misconduct, or because of procedural
inadequacies in the employer's dismissal process. In view of these
potentially unjust results, the authors recommend that British tribunals and courts maintain their traditional allegiance to the procedural integrity of the dismissal process.
3. The ReasonablenessRequirement and the Choice of Discharge
as a Penalty
Once a tribunal determines that a reasonable basis exists for
some sort of discipline, a second question arises as to the reasonableness of the choice of discharge as a penalty. The "range of
responses" doctrine, established in Rolls-Royce Ltd v. Wa/pole, 117
limits the power of a tribunal to review an employer's decision to
discharge. Under this doctrine, a discharge is reasonable if it falls
within "the band of reasonableness within which one employer
might reasonably . . . dismiss . . . [an employee whilst] the other
[employer] would quite reasonably keep him on.""18 A tribunal,
then, must accept any "reasonable" decision to discharge made by
an employer, and may not consider whether some action other than
dismissal might have been more reasonable under the circumstances.
In Bevan HarrisLtd v. Gair, 119 for example, an employer dismissed
a sixty-one year old employee for failing to carry out his duties. The
industrial tribunal noted that a reasonable employer would have
demoted rather than dismissed the employee and ruled that the dismissal was unfair. The EAT, however, reversed, stating that "they
[the tribunal] are in effect saying what they would have done had
they been employers. They have not applied themselves to the question of whether or not dismissal fell within the range of options open
to a reasonable employer in the circumstances of the case.' 20 Once
again,' 2 ' it appears that the plausible judgments of an employer are
sacrosanct.
The tribunal, however, must be certain that, in view of the surrounding circumstances, the discharge falls within that range of reasonable responses. Case interpretations of the statutory language
and the Code of Practice both have supplied factors relevant to a
117. [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 343.
118. British Leyland UK Ltd. v. Swift, [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 91, 93.
119. [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 520.
120. Id at 521.
121. Cf. Ferodo Ltd. v. Barnes, [1976] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 302, and supra notes 54-72
and accompanying text, where the EAT moved from an objective test for determining
whether the employee's infractions constituted a punishable offense, to an examination of
whether the employer himself had reasonable grounds to conclude subjectively that the
employee was guilty of misconduct.
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determination of whether the decision to discharge falls within this
"band of reasonableness." Section 57(3) of the EPCA states that the

question of reasonableness shall be determined "having regard to
equity and the substantial merits of the case."' 22 In several cases
tribunals and courts used this statutory language to develop criteria
for determining whether or not an employer's decision to discharge
was reasonable. These criteria include the consistency in the choice

of a particular penalty for certain types of misconduct,
responsibility for incompetency,

124

23

employer

and the presence of equitable

notions of estoppel.125 Additionally, tribunals often consider an
employee's length of service and previous good conduct when deter126
mining the appropriateness of a decision to discharge.
122. EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 57(3).
123. In The Post Office v. Fennell, [19811 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 221, for example, an
employer summarily dismissed an employee for assaulting another employee. The
employer, however, did not dismiss all employees involved in fights. The tribunal found
the dismissal unfair, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, stating:
It seems to me that the expression 'equity' as there [section 57(3) of the EPCAI
used comprehends the concept that employees who misbehave in much the same
way should have meted out to them much the same punishment, and it seems to
me that an Industrial Tribunal is entitled to say that, where that is not done, and
one man is penalized much more heavily than others who have committed similar offenses in the past, the employer has not acted reasonably in treating
whatever the offense is as a sufficient reason for dismissal.
Id at 223. See also infra note 125.
124. In Inner London Education Authority v. Lloyd, [1979] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 29, a
probationary teacher was dismissed for incompetency after a two-year period. For the
first 17 months, however, the employer did not know that the employee should have been
a probationary teacher, and thus did not provide the level of assistance that normally is
given to probationary teachers. The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of unfair dismissal on the ground that the employer was partially responsible for the employee's
incompetency.
125. Inconsistencies in penalties also may lead to a finding of unjust dismissal on the
ground of estoppel. In Hadjioannou v. Coral Casinos Ltd., [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep.
352, the EAT stated that the inconsistency of past penalties is relevant as evidence that
the employer led employees to believe that certain conduct either would be overlooked or
treated with a less severe sanction than dismissal. [d at 355.
126. These factors have no relation to the misconduct, and, therefore, also function as
mitigating factors in dismissal cases. In Taylor v. Parsons Peebles Nei Bruce Peebles
Ltd., [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 119, for example, an employer dismissed an employee for
fighting. The employer had a policy of dismissing all employees involved in fights. The
tribunal held the dismissal fair because the employer's action was consistent with his
policy concerning fighting on the job. The EAT reversed, saying that the employer's
policy was just one factor to consider in adjudging reasonableness, and that the length of
the employee's service and his good conduct in the past also were relevant
considerations.
Length of service is not always a mitigating factor, however, especially where the
offense is egregious. In AEI Cables Ltd. v. McLay, [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 84, for
example, an employer dismissed an employee for filing false vouchers for gas purchases.
Although recognizing that length of service sometimes acts as a mitigating factor, the
Court of Session ruled that discharge is a reasonable penalty where the employer's confidence in the employee is irreversibly damaged because of the gravity of an employee's
conduct. Id at 87.
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The Code ofPractice also provides criteria for ascertaining the
reasonableness of a discharge. Paragraph 10(d) of the Code states
that an employer should publish the disciplinary actions associated
with each type of misconduct. 27 In Dairy Produce Packers Ltd v.
Beverstock, 128 an employer discharged an employee for drinking in
a public house during working hours. The evidence submitted at the
hearing showed that the employer imposed lesser penalties on
employees caught drinking in the factory. The EAT ruled that a
reasonable employer may set different penalties for drinking offgrounds and drinking in the factory, but discharge in this case did
not fall within the range of reasonable responses because the collective bargaining agreement did not clearly delineate the penalties
associated with the misconduct. 129 The discharge, therefore, was
unfair because the employee had no warning that a different penalty
(i.e., discharge) would apply to drinking off-grounds.
In summary, then, in investigating both the decision to dismiss
and the appropriateness of discharge as a penalty for misconduct or
incapability, an increasing deference towards the plausible judgments of an employer has replaced the objective analysis formerly
conducted by a tribunal. Although an employer must establish a
reason for the discharge and conduct a reasonable investigation into
the circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct of an
employee, a tribunal will adjudge the decision to dismiss as reasonble if the evidence, on a "balance of the probabilities," supports the
subjective beliefs of an employer as to an employee's misconduct.
Industrial tribunals also afford employers a great deal of deference when reviewing a decision to discharge. If the decision to dismiss falls within the wide "range of responses" that reasonable
employers could adopt under the circumstances, the tribunal affirms
the decision to discharge. The tribunal does not decide what action
ought to have been taken under the circumstances, but only whether
the employer's choice of penalty (discharge) was one of the many
possible reasonable responses.
A residual allegiance to the procedural integrity of the dismissal
process, however, saves the British system from complete deference
to the decisions of an employer in discharge cases. Although, in
relative terms, the emphasis on procedural protections in unfair dis127. See Code of Practice,DisciplinaryPracticeandProceduresin Employment (Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service, 1977).
128. [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 265.
129. Id at 266. Indeed, it is highly likely that an employee would infer that offgrounds drinking would subject him to a less severe penalty than drinking in the factory
itself.
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missal cases has waned in recent years, it remains an important consideration in a tribunars review of the question of whether an
employer has conducted a reasonable investigation under the thirdprong of the Burchell test. Furthermore, tribunals will consider
objective criteria, such as the consistency of the penalty chosen for
certain types of misconduct and an employee's length of service, to
limit the range of disciplinary responses available to an employer in
a particular case.
C. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
1.

The Principleof De Novo Review

American arbitrators, on the whole, exhibit less deference
towards the judgments of management in dismissal cases than do
British industrial tribunals. It is, of course, difficult to generalize
about arbitration in view of the diversity that is characteristic of
arbitration proceedings across the United States. 130 It is fair to say,
however, that arbitration is most often viewed as an opportunity for
de novo review of the grievance by an arbitrator. One arbitrator,
commenting on his role in grievance proceedings, observed that "a
discharge case in arbitration is a hearing in equity, permitting a
flexibility and assessment of mitigating circumstances and factors
13 1 Siminot available under the more rigorous common law rules."'
larly, Harry H. Platt, a well-known arbitrator, emphasized the
importance of a de novo review in grievance proceedings, when
assessing both the merits of the decision to discipline and the choice
of discharge as a penalty. In one case, Platt observed that arbitrators
must decide:
what reasonable men, mindful of the habits and customs of industrial life
and of the standards of justice and fair dealing prevalent in the community,

ought to have done under similar circumstances and in that light to decide
the discharged employee was defensible and the diswhether the conduct of32

ciplinary penalty just.'
This approach outlined by Arbitrator Platt is quite similar to the
view that characterized British tribunals as "industrial juries," a role
adopted by the tribunals during the early years of the unfair dismis33
sal legislation.'
Arbitrators in the United States, however, typically do exhibit
deference towards managerial decisions related to the manufacturing
130. Arbitration is a private adjudicatory system, with the judges (arbitrators)
appointed by the parties to the dispute, and their jurisdiction limited by the collective
bargaining agreement. See M. TROTTA,ARBITRATION OF LABOR MANAGEMENT DisPUTEs
131.
132.
133.

23 (1974).
Capital Packing Co., 36 L.A. 101, 102 (1961).
Riley Stokes Corp., 7 L.A. 764, 767 (1947).
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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of a company's product and to decisions concerning the safety of
operations. In Valley Steel Casting Co., 134 for example, the arbitrator stated that in cases involving misconduct with a direct relation to

the company's product, "an arbitrator, in applying standards of
'proper cause' and 'injustice'.
ing management's decision."'

.
35

. should be more hesitant in overrulSimilarly, deference towards mana-

gerial decisions is common in cases involving safety considerations.
In Pacific Greyhound Lines,' 3 6 an employer dismissed a bus driver

for unsafe driving. Although recognizing that an independent evaluation was still appropriate, the arbitrator stated:
Even arbitrators who recognize what they are doing [i.e., making an
independent evaluation]. . . in an ordinary dismissal arbitration, are rightfully hesitant to disturb a termination that is based partly on safety considerations. No one, not even an arbitrator. . . wants to bear the heavy weight of
a dangerous man to a job in which
conscience for a lifetime, after returning
137
he continues to endanger everyone.

In most cases, then, arbitrators engage in a de novo review of the
decision of an employer to discipline or discharge. The adoption of
an independent review of an employer's decision is in marked contrast to the more deferential posture adopted by British tribunals and
courts in discharge cases. An examination of the mode of analysis
often used by arbitrators in cases involving "just cause" determinations illustrates additional differences between the two systems.
2

Proofof the Basisfor the Discharge. The Employer's Burden of
Proof

As in the British law on unfair dismissal, the first question an
arbitrator must ask is whether a sufficient basis exists for a finding of

misconduct or incapability. 138 A major difference between British
unfair dismissal law and American arbitration relates to which party
has the burden of proving the misconduct or incapability. In Great
Britain, the burden of showing the reasonableness of an employer's
134. 22 L.A. 520 (1954).
such situations the manufac135. Id at 525. Similarly, the arbitrator noted that "[i]n
turing concern must be in a position to protect its reputation and the quality of its product." Id
136. 30 L.A. 830 (1958).
137. Id at 834. The arbitrator, however, did order reinstatement in view of the
employee's past driving record which included seven safe driving awards. Id at 835-36.
See also American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 46 L.A. 1161, 1165 (1966); and United Airlines, Inc., 19 L.A. 585, 587 (1952).
138. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 18, at 621.
There are two areas of proof in the arbitration of discharge and discipline cases.
The first involves proof of wrongdoing, the second, assuming that guilt of wrongdoing is established and that the arbitrator is empowered to modify penalties,
concerns the question of whether the punishment assessed by management
should be upheld or modified.
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decision to discipline is neutral, and the employer's evidence need

only establish, by a "balance of probabilities," a "reasonable suspicion" of the misconduct.1 39 In the United States, however, the
employer consistently has the burden of proving the existence of just
cause for the discharge, although there is a variety of opinion as to
the quantum of proof necessary to establish "just cause."14o These

differing standards of proof traditionally have been classified as
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, by a preponderance of the evi-

dence, and by clear and convincing evidence.
There is no consensus among the commentators on arbitration
in the United States regarding the quantum of proof typically
required by arbitrators. Owen Fairweather, for example, suggests
that some arbitrators apply the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"

standard in cases involving discharge. 141 The apparent justification
for the imposition of this somewhat strict quantum of proof requirement is that discharge is "the capital punishment of the labor-management relationship."1 42 According to the well-known treatise by
Frank and Edna Elkouri, however, the majority of arbitrators, in

cases involving ordinary discipline and discharge, merely require
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

43

The commentators also emphasize, however, that it is difficult to
generalize about the quantum of proof requirement precisely
because that requirement is often a function of the nature of the

employee misconduct at issue. 144 In cases involving criminal conduct
or conduct which is morally reprehensible, -for example, arbitrators
typically require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.145 Arbitrators
appear to be aware of the gravity of such alleged offenses, the stigma

139. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
140. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 18, at 621.
Discharge is recognized to be the extreme industrial penalty since the employee's
job, his seniority and other contractual benefits, and his reputation are at stake.
Because of the seriousness of this penalty, the burdengenerally isheld to be on the
employer to prove guilt of wrongdoing, and probably always so where the agreement requires "just cause" for discharge. However, the quantum of required
proof in this area is unsettled. (emphasis added)
See also Kroger Co., 25 L.A. 906, 908 (1955) (the principle is well established in arbitration that the employer has the burden of proof on the issue of the existence of "just
cause" for disciplinary action).
141. See 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROTECTION IN LABOR ARBITRATION 205
(1973).
142. See W. BAER, supra note 41, at 30. Baer goes on to suggest that "[a]lthough
management will likely contest a depiction of discharge as equivalent to capital punishment, it will have to admit that such an action represents the severest penalty it can inflict
on its workers and that it always creates a hardship, often quite a critical one." Id at 35.
143. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 18, at 621-22.
144. Id
145. See 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 141, at 205-06; F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI,
supra note 18, at 623; and W. BAER, supra note 41, at 35.
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that attaches to the "convicted" employee, and the concomitant difficulty such an employee may have in finding new employment. In
cases involving alleged criminal conduct or moral turpitude, then,
[i]t is not alone a question of breaking the plant rules, the customary type of
case dealt with in labor arbitration, but also the breaking of the law of society.... It follows, therefore, that a decision against the individual would
have more far reaching results than breaking plant rules, in that it would
brand her for the rest of her life ... before her associates, friends and neighbors. Considering the gravity of the consequences, it follows logically to my
mind that the evidence should not leave
the shadow of reasonable doubt in
46
order to rule against [the employeel.

Finally, the collective bargaining agreement itself may limit the
discretion of an arbitrator to select the required quantum of proof.
If the parties specify the standard of proof in the contract, it will be
binding on the arbitrator, regardless of his personal views on the
146. Amelia Earhardt Luggage Co., 11 L.A. 301, 302 (1948). Another arbitrator
observed that
[i]n the field of proper industrial relations, the philosophy is as valid as in other
sociological and jurisprudential relationships, that it is better for an occasional
guilty person to escape unpunished than to court the possibility, through less
exacting norms, not only of punishing employees with loss of their jobs for acts
of which they may not be guilty but [of placing]... upon them what might be
an insurmountable burden in getting other employment.
Publishers Association of New York City, 43 L.A. 401,404 (1964). See also Standard Oil
of Ohio, 75 L.A. 588, 591 (1980) (arbitrators should use a beyond reasonable doubt standard in cases involving alleged theft of company property); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 75 L.A. 217, 221 (1980) (use of beyond a reasonable doubt standard in a case
involving theft of payroll checks); Safeway Stores, Inc., 55 L.A. 1195, 1201 (1971); and
Aladdin Industries, Inc., 27 L.A. 463, 465 (1956) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
required when conviction of charges (of plant sabotage and theft) reflects on the moral
character of the employee).
One arbitrator, Benjamin Aaron, argues that the requirement of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" involves a misconception of the role of an arbitrator in a labor dispute.
Aaron maintains that employer and employee are not in a position of prosecutor and
defendant, but rather that the employer, union, employee, and arbitrator are all partners
in a relationship designed to preserve and develop the collective bargaining relationship.
In this role, the arbitrator should balance the existence or nonexistence of any doubts as
to an employee's guilt against other damaging or mitigating circumstances, such as past
record, length of service, and the effect on the labor-management relationship. Aaron
believes that a strict requirement of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" would handicap
the arbitrator in this role. See Aaron, Some Procedural Problems in Arbitration, 10
VAND. L. REv. 733, 740-41 (1957).
Aaron's notion of the arbitrator as "plant psychiatrist," if extended to its full potential,
may radically alter the role of arbitrators in grievance resolution. See Stone, The PostWar Paradigmin American LaborLaw, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1559-65 (1981). Every grievance that reaches arbitration can be viewed, apart from its factual content, as a manifestation of employer-union conflict. Instead of providing judicial resolution to individual
grievances, the arbitrator, following Aaron, would become more concerned with diffusing labor-management tensions and preserving industrial order. Id. The danger associated with this view of the arbitrator's role is that it may sacrifice justice in individual
cases to the maintenance of an overall equilibrium between labor and management. The
authors maintain that arbitration should remain a forum for the resolution of individual
grievances and a source of industrial justice, while recognizing that the preservation of
good industrial relations should be a factor in the equation. Cf. Aaron, supra at 741.
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matter. If there is any ambiguity in the contract, the arbitrator will
attempt to ascertain the standard of proof that the parties intended to
147
be applied.
Arbitrators in the United States also differ in their treatment of
the problems of proof associated with dismissal cases involving more
than one employee. Some arbitrators require proof linking each
individual employee to the misconduct. 48 Other cases involving
group discipline, however, require only that an employer establish
the occurrence of the misconduct and that the dismissed employees
have an opportunity to commit the misconduct. 149 Once again,
unless prescribed by the requirements of a collective bargaining
agreement, it appears that proof requirements in cases involving
group discipline will vary with the facts of the case before the
arbitrator. 150
147. Still other arbitrators insist upon proof by clear and convincing evidence. In
.Ksco Company, Inc., the arbitrator ruled that he would not sustain a discharge "unless
proof of misconduct is highly convincing. While the proof need not meet the criminallaw standard of 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' it should be more persuasive than simply
the greater weight of the evidence." 75 L.A. 575, 585 (1980).
148. See Marhoefer Packing Co., 54 L.A. 649, 652-53 (1970) (arbitrator had no choice
but to dismiss a grievance where the employer had not established the guilt of each
employee); Westinghouse Electric Co., 48 L.A. 211, 213 (1967) (dismissal of 21 employees would not be sustained absent proof implicating all members of the group); Quick
Manufacturing Co., 45 L.A. 53, 56-57 (1963) (the dismissal of 12 employees without
establishing the guilt of any of them violated basic principles of justice in the United
States); and Evinrude Motors Co., 36 L.A. 1302, 1303 (1961) (in cases involving defective
work in the manufacturing process, where one of two employees was the culprit, group
discipline was inappropriate absent evidence linking both employees to the alleged
misconduct).
149. See Kennecott Copper Corp., 41 L.A. 1339, 1344 (1963) (proof of the culpability
of each employee is unnecessary in cases involving production slowdowns). See also F.
ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 18, at 624 n.73. This position corresponds to the
British law on burden of proof in group discipline cases. See supra note 96.
150. There is no simple answer to the nexus of problems involved in adjudicating
multiple employee dismissal cases. An employer, of course, wonders why he must retain
employees who refuse to exonerate themselves, and, in so doing, prevent the employer
from ascertaining who is responsible for the alleged misconduct. The employer may
argue that he has lost confidence in his employees, thereby rupturing an essential element
in the employment relationship. See Marhoefer Packing Co., 54 L.A. 649, 651-52 (1970).
On the other hand, one can understand the moral repugnancy associated with informing on a fellow employee. Furthermore, the potential penalty that the silent employee
must bear-loss of employment-may be unduly harsh in view of his possible factual
innocence. See id at 652.
In summary, both the employer and the employee have "understandable" positions in
cases involving group discipline. The validity of the respective positions may well vary
with the circumstances of a particular case. Consequently, the variety of views among
arbitrators as to the proof requirements in group discipline cases is appropriate.
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3. The StandardforDetermining the Appropriateness of Discharge
as a Penalty

After determining that a sufficient basis exists for disciplining
an employee, the arbitrator must analyze whether discharge is the

appropriate penalty. In Great Britain, discharge is appropriate if it
falls within the band of reasonableness within which one employer
might reasonably dismiss the employee whilst another would quite

reasonably keep him on.' 5 ' In the United States, most arbitrators
will sustain a discharge if it is not "arbitrary and capricious."
Instead of substituting his own judgment for that of an employer, the
arbitrator will uphold the discharge if it is "rational."'' 5 2 This test
seems to be equivalent to the range of responses doctrine' 53-reason-

able employers may differ as to what penalties certain types of misconduct warrant, and tribunals must accept any reasonable decision.
This apparent similarity between the "range of responses" doctrine
and the "arbitrary and capricious" test, however, obscures an impor-

tant substantive difference. The application of the "arbitrary and
capricious" test in fact produces results that are far less deferential to

management than those that are produced by the range of responses
doctrine. As one arbitrator stated:
The 'arbitrary and capricious' text . . .implies finer differentiation than.
merely that between innocence, requiring absolution, and guilt, necessarily
calling for dismissal. The contract provision envisions a range of discipline
from reduction in job classification to discharge or other disciplinary action.
This suggests that such matters as length of service, previous record, and the
exact nature and extent of dishonesty involved might all be brought into
play, both in the initial assessments of penalty, 4and in their subsequent
5
review, under the 'arbitrary and capricious' test.1

When applying the arbitrary and capricious test, then, the arbitrator
does more than ask whether a rational employer could have dis-

charged the employee. Instead, as part of his de novo review, the
arbitrator evaluates the decision to discharge in view of a broad
151. British Leyland UK Ltd. v. Swift, [1981] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 91, 93. See also
supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
152. As one arbitrator stated:
Where an employee has violated a rule or engaged in conduct meriting disciplinary action, it is primarily the function of management to decide upon the
proper penalty. If management acts in good faith upon a fair investigation and
fixes a penalty not inconsistent with that imposed in other like cases, an arbitrator should not disturb it. The mere fact that management has imposed a somewhat different penalty or a somewhat more severe penalty than the arbitrator
would have,. . . is no justification for changing it. The minds of equally reasonable men differ.
Stockham Pipe Fittings Co., 1 L.A. 160, 162 (1945).
153. Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. Walpole, [19801 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 343, 346.
154. Schmitt v. Local No. 34, Food Store Employers Union, FMCS Case No. 79 K/
06383, October 24, 1979 (unpublished, Hanslowe).

1983]

]REASONABLENESS AND JUST CA USE

range of possible penalties and mitigating factors.' 55
In determining whether the selection of discharge as a penalty is
"arbitrary and capricious," an arbitrator applies many of the same
criteria used by British industrial tribunals under the "equity and
substantial merits" test.156 In their treatise on arbitration, Frank and
Edna Elkouri have compiled a useful survey of factors that have
appeared in numerous arbitration cases. They include the following:
the nature of the offense; the extent to which procedures were followed; post-discharge conduct of the grievant; the past record of the
grievant; the grievant's length of service with the company; the grievant's knowledge of the penalties; the consistency of enforcement and
penalties for similar conduct; whether or not the grievant alleges
anti-union discrimination; and the extent to which management is
157
also at fault.
In summary, the determination of "reasonableness" under British unfair dismissal law and of "just cause" under American arbitration is quite similar in some respects. A significant difference,
however, exists in the determination of the sufficiency of the basis for
discipline. In Great Britain, the employer does not have the burden
of showing the reasonableness of his decision to discipline, and the
tribunal need only find, by a "balance of the probabilities," that the
evidence created a "reasonable suspicion" in the mind of the
employer that the misconduct occurred. In the United States, however, arbitrators generally perform an independent examination or
de novo review to determine whether misconduct actually occurred,
and, although the quantum of proof required may differ among arbitrators, the onus of proof is consistently placed upon the employer.
A less significant though important difference exists between the
two systems in their modes of determining the appropriateness of
discharge as a penalty. In Great Britain, the "range of responses"
doctrine instructs industrial tribunals to ask only if discharge was a
reasonable penalty under the circumstances, and not to substitute
their own perception of the proper penalty for the employer's perception. In the United States, although arbitrators generally accord
some deference to the penalty selected by the employer under the
155. Other arbitrators, however, may utilize the same independent analysis used in
determining the sufficiency of the basis for discipline when determining the appropriateness of discharge. As one arbitrator candidly admitted: "We may mouth the words
[never to substitute one's judgment for that of the employer], but we know that in order
to determine whether a dismissal is for just or sufficient cause, we must consult our own
hearts and minds to ascertain justice." Pacific Greyhound Lines, 30 L.A. 830, 834 (1958).
156. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
157. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 18, at 630-47.
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"arbitrary and capricious" test, they remain less hesitant to overturn
a discharge where the aforementioned mitigating factors are present.
III
AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE ALTERNATIVE
REMEDIES

Once an employer establishes an employee's misconduct or
incapability, the question arises as to the authority of third party
adjudicators to devise an alternative remedy where discharge is not

an appropriate penalty. Under the British law on unfair dismissal, a
tribunal decides the fairness of an employer's decision to discharge.

If a tribunal finds a dismissal unfair, it provides the employee with
one of his statutory remedies-compensation, reinstatement, or reengagement. 158 Most arbitration agreements in the United States, on
the other hand, provide arbitrators with far greater flexibility in

cases where dismissal is too harsh a penalty for an employee's misconduct. 159 Once again, however, it is important to realize that the

power of an arbitrator to alter an employer's penalty decision is a
function of the contractual agreement between the employer and the
union. Consequently, an arbitrator may be without the power to
alter an employer's penalty decision upon a finding of employee

misconduct.

160

158. See EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 68. The statute provides the following procedures:
68.--(1) Where on a complaint under section 67 an industrial tribunal finds
that the grounds of the complaint are well-founded, it shall explain to the complainant what orders for reinstatement or re-engagement may be made under
section 69 and in what circumstances they may be made, and shall ask him
whether he wishes the tribunal to make such an order, and if he does express
such a wish the tribunal may make an order under section 69.
(2) If on a complaint under section 67 the tribunal finds that the grounds of
the complaint are well-founded and no order is made under section 69, the tribunal shall make an award of compensation for unfair dismissal, calculated in
accordance with sections 72 to 74, to be paid by the employer to the employee.
159. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKouRI, supra note 18, at 648, wherein the authors note
that,
If a penalty of discharge is upset through arbitration, the award often will order
reinstatement either with back pay, without back pay, or with partial back pay,
and often will further order that other rights and privileges shall remain
unimpaired; or the discharge may be commuted to suspension for a specified
period, or even to a reduced penalty of only a reprimand or warning.
160. See generally 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 141, at 280-300. One arbitrator, for
example, concluded that he had no authority to reinstate 21 wrongfully discharged strikers because the contractual agreement limited the arbitrator to a decision as to whether
the employee did or did not participate in the misconduct charged, and prohibited the
arbitrator from substituting "his judgment or discretion for that of management."
Magnavox Co., AAA Case No. 111-8 Oppenheim, (1967), as cited in 0. FAIRWEATHER,
.pra note 141, at 288.
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A.

THE BRITISH LAW ON UNFAIR DISMISSAL

The reinstatement of the discharged employee is the primary
statutory remedy available to employees in cases involving unfair
dismissal.' 61 In practice, however, British tribunals and courts rarely
invoke the reinstatement remedy.162 Instead, tribunals typically pro161. See EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 68. The Act differentiates reinstatement from reengagement in the following manner.
69.-(1) An order under this section may be an order for reinstatement (in
accordance with subsections (2) or (3)) or an order for re-engagement (in accordance with subsection (4)), as the industrial tribunal may decide, and in the latter
case may be on such terms as the tribunal may decide.
(2) An order for reinstatement is an order that the employer shall treat the
complainant in all respects as if he had not been dismissed, and on meeting such
an order the tribunal shall specify(a) any amount payable by the employer in respect of any benefit which the
complainant might reasonably be expected to have had but for the dismissal,
including arrears of pay, for the period between the date of termination of
employment and the date of reinstatement;
(b) any rights and privileges, including seniority and pension rights, which
must be restored to the employee; and
(c) the date by which the order must be complied with.
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2), if the complainant
would have benefited from an improvement in his terms and conditions of
employment had he not been dismissed, an order for reinstatement shall require
him to be treated as if he had benefited from that improvement in his terms and
conditions of employment had he not been dismissed, an order for reinstatement
shall require him to be treated as if he had benefited from that improvement
from the date on which he would have done so but for being dismissed.
(4) An order for re-engagement is an order that the complainant be engaged
by the employer, or by a successor of the employer or by an associated employer,
in employment comparable to that from which he was dismissed or other suitable employment, and on making such an order the tribunal shall specify the
terms on which re-engagement is to take place including(a) the identity of the employer,
(b) the nature of the employment;
(c) the remuneration for the employment;
(d) any amount payable by the employer in respect of any benefit which the
complainant might reasonably be expected to have had but for the dismissal,
including arrears of pay, for the period between the date of termination of
employment and the date of re-engagement;
(e) any rights and privileges, including seniority and pension rights, which
must be restored to the employee; and
(f) the date by which the order must be complied with.
EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 69. See also supra note 11.
162. See S.D. ANDERMAN, supra note 30, at 81-82 for a discussion of the prevalence of
the compensation remedy in dismissal cases under the 1971 Act.
More recent statistics indicate the continued importance of compensation as a remedy
in unfair dismissal cases. In 1981, for example, 2778 employees were successful at the
industrial tribunal level in actions alleging unfair dismissal. Of those employees, the
tribunal ordered only 55 (2%) reinstated, and 23 (1%) reengaged. Further, those awarded
compensation received nominal amounts in view of the seriousness of an employee's loss
of employment. In 1981, the median compensation was £963; over 28% of the awards
were under £500; over 50% of the awards were under £1,000; 43% of the awards were
between £1,000 and £5,000; and 47% of the awards were over £5,000. See 90 DEP'T
EMPL'T GAz. 538 (Dec., 1982). It also should be noted that of cases reaching the hearing
stage, only 23% of the employees succeeded in their complaints alleging unfair dismissal.
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vide unfairly dismissed employees with monetary compensation
after perfunctorily noting the "impracticability" of the reinstatement
and re-engagement remedies.
Once a tribunal determines that a discharge was unfair, the statute expressly limits a tribunal's authority to implement alternative
remedies. Section 68 of the EPCA provides that a tribunal, upon a
finding of unfair dismissal, must explain to the employee the reinstatement or re-engagement remedies, and consult with the employee as to the preferred remedy. 63 If the employee wants to return to
work, Section 69 of the EPCA instructs the tribunal to consider reinstatement as the primary remedy. 164 When considering the reinstatement remedy, the tribunal must take three factors into account:
(1) whether the complainant wishes to be reinstated; (2) whether it is
practicable for the employer to comply with an order for reinstatement; and where the employee's conduct justified some action by the
employer, (3) whether it would be "just" to order the reinstatement
of the employee. 16 5 The statute provides that a tribunal may not
consider the fact that the employer hired a permanent replacement
for the complainant, unless the employer proves that it was not practicable for him to arrange for the completion of the work done by the
66
dismissed employee without engaging a permanent replacement.
If the tribunal determines that reinstatement is impracticable, it
then must consider the possibility of the re-engagement of the dismissed employee. Pursuant to section 69, the factors relevant to a
determination of the appropriateness of this remedy include: the
wishes of the employee; the practicability of re-engagement by the
employer, associated employer, or successor employer; and, where
the actions of the employee justified some action by the employer,
whether it would be "just" to order his re-engagement. 67 Finally, if
the tribunal finds both reinstatement and re-engagement impracticable or inequitable, it then must consider what monetary compensa68
tion is appropriate under sections 72-74 of the EPCA.'
In 1975, Parliament amended the employment statute to highlight the preferred status of reinstatement and re-engagement as the
Id Because of this difference between the statutory scheme and the common practices of
tribunals, Anderman notes: "the safeguards against unfair dismissal contained within
the act have added less to security of employment than to an entitlement to compensation
for loss of that security." S.D. ANDERMAN, supra note 30, at 82.
163. EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 68(1).
164. Id § 69(5).
165. Id
166. Id § 70.
167. Id § 69(4) and (6).
168. Id § 68(2).
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appropriate remedies in cases involving unfair dismissals. 169 The
EAT also began to instruct the tribunals to consider more seriously
the implementation of these remedies. In Qualcast (Wolverhampton)
Ltd v. Ross, 170 for example, the industrial tribunal refused to order
reinstatement because they "did not consider it expedient."' 171 On
appeal, the EAT ruled for the employee, and criticized the tribunal
72 Simifor its perfunctory dismissal of the reinstatement remedy.'
larly, in PirelliGeneral Cable Works Ltd v. Murray,173 the tribunal,
upon a finding of unfair dismissal, ordered the re-engagement of the
dismissed employee, but left the terms of the negotiations to the parties. The EAT ruled that the tribunal must determine the terms of
re-engagement, and that the failure to do so inadequately protects
74
the remedial rights of the employee.'

There remains some resistance to the use of the reinstatement
and re-engagement remedies, however, perhaps stemming from
some residual allegiance to the notion that the employment relationship is entirely voluntary. Accordingly, there are indications that
compensation will remain the primary remedy in unfair dismissal
cases. In Nothman v. London Borough of Barnet, 17 for example, the

employee, although unfairly dismissed, was denied reinstatement
because she had made allegations against staff member that precluded her from working side by side with them again. The Court of
Appeal dismissed Ms. Nothman's appeal of the denial of her reinstatement request, and held that the proper test was whether, in the
employer's eyes, the employee was likely to perform her work
satisfactorily if reinstated or re-engaged.' 76 Furthermore, the court
noted that even if reinstatement was proper, the Act gave the tribunals no authority to compel reinstatement if the employer would not
agree to that remedy. 7 Under these circumstances, the court ruled,
a tribunal could only increase the compensatory award to the
78
employee.'
169. Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71,

§§

71-80, particularly at § 71(2)-(7).

170. [1979] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 98.
171. Id. at 98.
172. Id at 101. The EAT ruled that considerations of expediency were not relevant to
a determination of the appropriateness of the reinstatement of an employee upon a
finding of unfair dismissal. In the future, the EAT noted, industrial tribunals must rely
upon statutorily prescribed criteria for assessing the appropriateness of the reinstatement
remedy. Id See also EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 71.
173. [1979] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 190.
174. Id at 192. See also EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, § 69(b).
175. [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 65.
176. Id at 66.
177. Id
178. Id See also EPCA, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 69 & 71(2)(b). Furthermore, in Enessy Co.
SA/TA The Tulchan Estate v. Minoprio & Minoprio, [1978] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 489,
490, the EAT noted, in dicta, that the involvement of a small employer in an unfair
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In summary, although the employment statutes direct tribunals

to consider reinstatement as the primary remedy, it appears that, in
practice, compensation will remain an employee's primary remedy
in most unfair dismissal cases. Furthermore, the EPCA limits the

remedial measures available to tribunals in unfair dismissal cases to
reinstatement, re-engagement or compensation. The arbitration process in the United States, however, provides a potential for the

implementation of a broader variety of employee remedies.
B.

GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The authority of American arbitrators to modify penalties is
entirely a function of the contractual relations existing between the
parties. Consequently, one will find that some collective bargaining
agreements provide arbitrators with far-ranging modification powers, while other agreements deny arbitrators these powers even in
cases where mitigating factors indicate that a less severe penalty
would be appropriate.' 79 Where the contract is silent on the issue of
an arbitrator's power to modify penalties, most arbitrators assume
that the power to modify is implicit in their arbitral role:
In disciplinary cases generally, therefore, most arbitrators exercise the right
to change or modify a penalty if it is found to be improper or too severe,
under all the circumstances of the situation. This right is deemed to be inherent in the arbitrator's power to discipline and in his authority to finally settle
and adjust the dispute before him. 180

Several considerations may limit the discretionary powers of an
arbitrator to modify an employer's decisions. First, arbitrators
receive very little objective information upon which to base a decidismissal case forces a tribunal to consider a number of factors not relevant in reinstatement cases involving larger employers. The tribunal observed that
It is one thing to make an order for reinstatement where the employee concerned
works in a factory or other substantial organization. It is another to do so in the
case of a small employer with few staff. . . . Where there must exist a close
personal relationship as is the case here, reinstatement can only be appropriate in
exceptional circumstances and to enforce it upon a reluctant employer is not a
course which an industrial tribunal should pursue unless persuaded by powerful
evidence that it would succeed.
Id at 490.
179. In Consumers Oil Co., 77 L.A. 141 (1981), for example, the contract prohibited
the arbitrator from reducing a discharge penalty, and restricted his role to that of determining whether the "employee committed the offense for which he was charged." Id at
141.
180. F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 18, at 629, citing from Platt, The Arbitration Process in the Settlement of Labor Disputes, 31 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 54, 58 (1947).
Case examples of modified penalties are legion. Some of the most recent decisions
include: Holiday Markets, 77 L.A. 648 (1981) (discharge modified to 60 day suspension
because of grievant's good record); Oscar Meyer & Co., 77 L.A. 478 (1981) (discharge
modified to one-year suspension because contract did not specifically state that discharge
was the only penalty for leaving work early); and Borg-Warner Corp., 77 L.A. 443 (198 1)
(discharge modified to 60-day suspension because of grievant's good record).
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sion to modify.1 81 Both the union and the employer will advocate
only their respective sides, and little incentive exists for either party
to be the first to support a compromise position. Thus, although the
arbitrator may have the authority to modify, he may choose not to
exercise that power because of the lack of an adequate factual basis
from which to determine the appropriate penalty. Second, if prior
settlements between the employer and the union have led to one specific type of compromise penalty, the arbitrator may feel restricted
by deference to the past practices between the parties when consider82
ing whether or not to use his modification powers.
Regardless of its comparative merit, the authority to select alternative penalties is a major distinguishing characteristic between the
American arbitration system and the British law on unfair dismissal.
There is no statutory basis in Great Britain for remedies such as suspensions, leaves without pay, or warnings, remedies that often are
available to arbitrators in the United States. It is difficult to ascertain precisely how these limited remedial measures affect unfair dismissal findings, but the statutory restrictions necessarily inhibit a
British tribunal's capacity to achieve industrial justice in the individual case. On the other hand, the practical problems that may limit
the discretion of an arbitrator in the United States, namely a lack of
information and the past practices between the parties, may produce
modified penalties that are the results of guesswork or may produce
results that surprise the parties. If this is the case, industrial justice
similarly may be lacking in individual arbitration cases.
IV
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO SYSTEMS
Our comparative examination of the British law on unfair dismissal and American arbitration reveals a variety of differences and
similarities between the two systems. Recent developments in the
British law indicate an increasing deference towards the views
181. See Seitz, Substitutionof DisciplinarySuspension ForDischarge,35 ARB. J. 27, 28
(June, 1980).
An advocate for the employer intent upon proving to the arbitrator just cause
for discharge cannot be expected, in most cases, to furnish him with the facts that
would enable him to fashion or shape the more appropriate remedy of disciplinary suspension. An advocate for the union, whose single position is that the
grievant should be reinstated with full back pay, similarly, cannot be expected, at
the hearing or in his brief, to discuss the disciplinary measure deemed to be more
appropriate than discharge. Yet, the arbitrator, his eyes bound like the statue of
Justice. . . is expected, by both parties and their advocates, to ignore their arguments to sustain the grievance and to commute the discharge penalty to something more appropriate in the circumstances.
182. Id at 28.
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and judgments of management in unfair dismissal cases. After Taylor v. Alidair Ltd, 183 for example, we noted that the focal point for
determining the reasonableness of a dismissal decision is not
whether or not the alleged misconduct occurred, but, rather, whether
a reasonable employer could reasonably believe that an employee
committed the misconduct. Similarly, the "range of responses" doctrine of Rolls-Royce v. Wapole 184 presents an employer with a broad
spectrum of possible rational penalties rather than encouraging the
choice of the best penalty available under the circumstances. These
disquieting developments are indicative of a movement away from
an objective adjudication of the basis of a discharge; a movement
that may jeopardize the realization of substantive justice in unfair
dismissal proceedings. The British courts and tribunals, however,
remain committed to procedural justice in dismissal cases, although
recent developments in this area are also troubling. 85 The Burchell
test, for example, requires that an employer engage in a reasonable
investigation before dismissing any employee. 8 6 Furthermore, the
Code of Practice delineates important procedural guidelines for
assessing an employer's disciplinary procedures and for a tribunal's
determination of fairness, exhibiting a continuing concern for the
procedural adequacy of discharge proceedings. Therefore, while
many of the developments noted above impede the realization of
substantive justice, the present state of the British unfair dismissal
system does provide distinct procedural protections.
Arbitration in the United States, on the other hand, exhibits a
continuing commitment to the realization of substantive justice.
Unlike British industrial tribunals, American arbitrators generally
engage in an objective examination of the basis of a discharge, and
proceed as an "industrial jury" by independently assessing the propriety of discharge. Furthermore, arbitration in the United States
requires an employer to prove, by varying degrees of proof depending upon the nature of the misconduct, that "just cause" exists for a
discharge decision, while the burden of proving the fairness of discharge is neutral under the current British system. Finally, Ameri183. [19781 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 82.
184. [1980] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 343.
185. Although this article notes a trend in some recent decisions away from the strong
emphasis on proper dismissal procedures, it is the view of the authors that many of these
decisions are explained by the heinous nature of the employee's misconduct. See, e.g.,
supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. Furthermore, other decisions, and the continuing viability of the Code ofPractice, indicate a strong concern in the tribunals and
courts that employers follow established disciplinary procedures when discharging an
employee. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying notes. For a more political discussion of the proceduralist aspects of the British law, see Collins, supra note 3, at 87-88.
186. See supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.

1983]

REASONABLENESS AND JUST CA USE

can arbitrators frequently use reinstatement as a remedy in unfair
dismissal cases, while the British dismissal proceedings presently
function primarily as a guarantor of severance pay where a dismissal
is unfair. Arbitration in the United States, then, tends to promote
true job security for those employees whose employment contracts
contain arbitration clauses.
The major weaknesses associated with the mode of adjudicating
unjust dismissal cases in the United States are a function of the
dependence of the arbitration process upon the individual collective
bargaining agreements. Consequently, arbitrators, unlike British
industrial tribunals, serve at the will of the employer and union.
Additionally, because private-sector arbitration exists only where
union representation is present, a lower percentage of American
employees enjoy protection from unfair dismissal than do employees
in Great Britain under the unfair dismissal law. 18 7 Finally, there is a

potential for a pronounced disparity in the substantive rights among
employees in the United States, precisely because there is a potential
for pronounced differences in the provisions of the individual
employment contracts.
Our comparative examination of the strengths and weaknesses
of the American and British systems reveals the contours of a better
method of adjudicating unjust dismissal cases. An unfair dismissal
statute, covering all employees, with independent arbitrators determining the fairness of dismissals based upon objective considerations, would protect employees from the arbitrary actions of
employers. Furthermore, legislation that places the burden of showing "just cause" on the employer, and mandates the use of reinstatement as the primary remedy in unfair dismissal cases, would protect
innocent employees from unfair discharges. In the United States, a
federal statute would achieve these aims; in Great Britain, adherence
to objective criteria rather than an employer's impressions, and a
return to an independent role for industrial tribunals, would correct
many of the extant inadequacies in the unjust dismissal law. During
times of high unemployment and economic uncertainty, this system
of law would provide employees in both the United States and Great
Britain with an equitable degree of job security.

187. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.

